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Notes
The Congressional Resurrection of
Supplemental Jurisdiction in the
Post-Finley Era
by
ELEN S. MoucHiwA_*
Pendent and ancillary jurisdiction have been branded the
"child[ren] of necessity and sire[s] of confusion."' These doctrines
have generated confusion among the federal courts because the constitutional parameters of the courts' jurisdictional power 2 have been
3
poorly defined, inconsistently interpreted, and haphazardly applied.

The separate and dissimilar development of the two doctrines has induced most federal courts to distinguish between them, which in turn
has created uncertainty among the circuits. Although the Supreme

Court converged the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction
in the late 1970s by adopting a uniform theoretical framework for all

exercises of extra-jurisdictional power, 4 most lower courts were reluctant to follow. 5 The Court's attempt at uniformity did not eliminate

the confusion.
Although the doctrines remain poorly defined, they are necessary

judicial creations for the efficient adjudication of lawsuits in an over*

Member, Third Year Class; B.A. 1987, Stanford University.
1. Note, Federal Practice: Jurisdiction of Third-Party Claims, 11 Oiru. L. REv. 326,
329 (1958) (authored by Jay C. Baker) [hereinafter Note, Federal Practice].
2. This Note focuses on the power of the federal courts to exercise pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction. Although it is "recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion,
not of plaintiff's right," United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966), discussion
of the federal court's discretion to refrain from exercising pendent and ancillary jurisdiction
is beyond the scope of this Note.
3. See infra notes 59-69, 101-118 and accompanying text.
4. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976) (creating an analytical framework for the
pendent-party jurisdictional power determination); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger,
437 U.S. 365, 372-73 (1978) (applying the Aldinger analysis to the determination of pendentclaim and ancillary jurisdictional power). See infra Part I.D.
5. See Note, Developing a Unified Approach to Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction:A
Merger Made in Heaven, 11 VT. L. RPv. 505, 512-20 (1986) (authored by Priscilla Dodakian
Krikorian) [hereinafter Note, Developing a Unified Approach]; infra notes 215-217 and
accompanying text.
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burdened federal court system. 6 By allowing parties to litigate "nonfederal" claims with related "federal" claims ,7 pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction enable federal courts to hear an entire controversy and
avoid piecemeal litigation. Consequently, these doctrines foster judicial efficiency, procedural convenience, and party fairness by creating one sensible litigation package.8 Moreover, they promote the
congressional purposes underlying the grant of original federal jurisdiction: providing plaintiffs a true choice between state and federal
forums for adjudication of their entire controversy and ensuring the
availability of a federal forum for the vindication of federal rights. 9
Despite their necessity, pendent and ancillary jurisdiction virtually
were extinguished in Finley v. United States 0 by the Supreme Court's
holding that explicit congressional authorization was necessary for
courts to exercise extra-jurisdictional power." In so holding, the Court
6. See generally Van Dusen, Comments on the Volume of Litigation in the Federal
Courts, 8 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 435, 435 (1983) (arguing that "the single most immediate
problem confronting the federal judiciary is the overwhelming caseload of the federal courts")
(emphasis in original). Professor Van Dusen notes that .'[i]n 1882, there were less than 30,000
total cases pending in the United States district and circuit courts. One hundred years later,
Annual civil filings in the federal district courts more than
there were nearly 240,000 ....
tripled between 1960 and 1981. During the same time, appeals increased sevenfold."' Id. at
436-37 (quoting Smith, Role of the Federal Courts, 88 CASE & COM. 10 (1983)).
7. As used herein, a "nonfederal claim" has no independent basis for federal jurisdiction,
and thus is jurisdictionally insufficient. Conversely, a "federal claim" has an independent
basis of federal jurisdiction.
8. Courts and commentators have viewed these considerations as the primary purposes
underlying the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman,
397 U.S. 397, 405 (1970) (pendent jurisdiction is based on "the commonsense policy" of "the
conservation of judicial energy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation"); United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (pendent jurisdiction is justified by "judicial
economy, convenience and fairness to litigants"); Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 383
U.S. 607, 617 n.14 (1966) (ancillary jurisdiction rests on "considerations of judicial economy
and fairness"); Mengler, The Demise of Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 1990 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 247, 249; Miller, Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 26 S. TEx. L.J. 1, 1 (1985); 13 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND
RELATED MATTERS § 3523, at 85-86 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION] ("[a]ncillary jurisdiction exists because without it the federal court
neither could dispose of the principal case effectively nor do complete justice in the dispute
[It is] a commonsense solution to the problems of piecemeal
that is before the tribunal ....
litigation").
Professor Mengler served as an advisor to the Federal Courts Study Committee in the
development of the legislation codifying supplemental jurisdiction at 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See
H.R. REP. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 27 n.13, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 6860, 6873 n.13; Posner, Introduction [to Federal Courts Symposium], 1990
B.Y.U. L. REv. 1.
9. Mengler, supra note 8, at 249; Schenkier, Ensuring Access to Federal Courts: A
Revised Rationale for Pendent Jurisdiction, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 245, 247-48, 251-56 (1980); see
infra notes 205-207, 257-260 and accompanying text.
10. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
11. Id. at 549.
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explicitly and implicitly asserted that the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction represented "unconstitutional usurpation[s] of
power.' 1 2 A close reading of the Finley opinion, however, suggests
the Court's awareness of not only the undesirable consequences accompanying the extinction of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction 13 but
also the need for a legislative response.' 4 The Court's opinion essentially invited Congress to remedy the jurisdictional problems created
by its decision."I On October 28, 1990, Congress accepted the Supreme
Court's invitation by enacting section 1367 of Title 28 of the United
6
States Code.1
Section 1367 not only resurrects pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, it also makes great strides in resolving much of the confusion
surrounding the doctrines. Of primary importance is the adoption of
a uniform test for any exercise of "supplemental jurisdiction."' 7 Federal courts now may exercise supplemental jurisdiction "over all claims
that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under
Article III of the United States Constitution."'"8 Thus, section 1367
establishes a uniform standard that allows a federal court to determine

when it may adjudicate a nonfederal claim as an adjunct to its jurisdiction over the federal claim, regardless of whether the nonfederal
claim comes within the doctrine of pendent or ancillary jurisdiction.
12. Perdue, Finley v. United States: Unstringing Pendent Jurisdiction, 76 VA. L. REv.
539, 567 (1990).
13. See infra notes 256-263 and accompanying text.
14. Mengler, Burbank & Rowe, Congress Accepts Supreme Court's Invitation to Codify
Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 JuDicATURE 213, 214 (1991).
15. Id.; H.R. REP. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 28, reprintedin 1990 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD
. NEWS 6860, 6874; 136 CONa. REc. S17,580-81 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement
of Sen. Grassley) (adopting the House analysis). See Finley, 490 U.S. at 550.
16. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West Supp. 1991). Congress passed section 1367 as part of Title
III of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
Title III is titled the "Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990." See
infra note 271.
17. The term "supplemental jurisdiction" refers to the doctrines of both pendent and
ancillary jurisdiction. Even before the enactment of § 1367, some courts and commentators
had embraced this unifying terminology, arguing that no meaningful distinctions exist between
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. See, e.g., Community Coffee v. K/S Kriti Amethyst, 715
F. Supp. 772, 774 (E.D. La. 1989); Freer, A PrincipledApproach to Supplemental Jurisdiction,
1987 DurK L.J. 34, 34; Matasar, A Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction Primer: The Scope
and Limits of Supplemental Jurisdiction, 17 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 103, 104 (1983) [hereinafter
Matasar, A Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction Primer]; Matasar, Rediscovering "One Constitutional Case'" ProceduralRules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test for Supplemental
Jurisdiction, 71 CAxn. L. REv. 1399, 1401 (1983) [hereinafter Matasar, Rediscovering "One
ConstitutionalCase'"; Mengler, supra note 8, at 247.
18. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a) (West Supp. 1991).
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Nonetheless, ambiguities remain. First, although explicitly authorizing supplemental jurisdiction, section 1367 provides little guidance as to the constitutional limits of the courts' power. This Note
suggests that the constitutional limitations referred to in section 1367
permit a pragmatic "logical relationship" approach to the litigation
unit. In other words, the statute empowers federal courts to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction whenever a logical relationship exists between the federal and nonfederal claims, thus providing an efficient
and just litigation of claims in a single lawsuit. This approach eliminates the previous distinctions between pendent and ancillary standards. Moreover, it promotes Congress' intent to create an attractive
federal forum for the adjudication of federal issues while fostering the
goals of judicial efficiency, convenience, and party fairness. 19
Second, section 1367(b) places special limitations on federal supplemental power in cases based solely on diversity of citizenship. 20 Even
before Finley, courts restricted the circumstances in which plaintiffs
could raise claims against nondiverse third parties in diversity cases
because of concerns that supplemental jurisdiction would encourage
plaintiffs to evade the complete diversity requirement. 21 Section 1367(b)
is consistent with this modern trend.
The additional limitations of section 1367(b), however, are subject
to varying interpretations. Subsection (b) could be interpreted expansively to prohibit all nonfederal claims raised by a plaintiff against a
nondiverse party in a diversity case. Alternatively, a restrictive reading
could prohibit supplemental jurisdiction only in cases in which a plaintiff initiates the joinder 22 of a nondiverse defendant or a nondiverse
19. See Schenkier, supra note 9, at 247-48.
20. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(b) provides that in any diversity action:
the district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction ... over claims by
plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as
plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under
Rule 24 or such rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims
would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(b) (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). See infra text accompanying notes
312-313.
21. E.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374-75 (1978). See Note,
A Closer Look at Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Toward a Theory of Incidental Jurisdiction, 95 HAv. L. Ray. 1935, 1941-43, 1946-53 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Toward a Theory
of Incidental Jurisdiction]; infra notes 201-203 and accompanying text.
In 1806, the Supreme Court held that the general diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332,
requires complete diversity. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806). Thus,
diversity does not exist in federal court unless each defendant is a citizen of a state different
from each plaintiff. Id. Complete diversity is not, however, a constitutional requirement. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967).
22. Joinder permits all persons to unite as parties to an action who have related claims
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absentee seeks to intervene2 as a plaintiff. This Note argues that a
middle-of-the-road approach would address the concern that plaintiffs
might circumvent the diversity requirement, but would not unduly restrict plaintiffs' abilities to raise claims against nondiverse third parties. This approach would limit section 1367(b)'s special restrictions
to cases in which a plaintiff in an offensive position seeks to raise a
claim against a nondiverse party.2
Part I of this Note reviews the doctrines of pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction as they existed before Finley, focusing upon their confusing and inconsistent application. Part II discusses the Finley decision, emphasizing how it threatened the continued viability of pendent
and ancillary jurisdiction. Finally, Part III examines the recent congressional resurrection of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction through
the passage of section 1367 and proposes the above recommendations

for the interpretation and implementation of this new federal statute.
I.

The Evolution of Supplemental Jurisdiction

The federal courts are forums of limited jurisdiction. 2 The primary limitations on federal subject matter jurisdiction are imposed by
the Constitution.2 Article III lists the discrete classes of cases over
which federal courts have judicial power. 27 Articles I and III further
or against whom rights are claimed, as either co-plaintiffs or co-defendants. FED. R. Civ. P.
19 and 20. See infra notes 72, 168-182 and accompanying text. See also FED. R. Cv. P. 14
(impleader); infra notes 139-167 and accompanying text.
23. Intervention permits third parties, not originally parties to the suit, to come into the
case by claiming an interest in the subject matter, in order to protect their rights or to interpose
their claims. FED. R. Civ. P. 24. See infra notes 183-195 and accompanying text.
24. Thus, a plaintiff in a defensive position could bring a claim against a nondiverse
party. For example, if the defendant were to implead a nondiverse third-party defendant under
Fm. R. Civ. P. 14(a), see infra note 124, and that third-party defendant were to bring a
claim against the original plaintiff, placing that plaintiff in a defensive position, then the
plaintiff could bring a compulsory counterclaim against the nondiverse third-party defendant.
However, if the third-party defendant did not bring a claim against the original plaintiff, then
that plaintiff, still in an offensive position as to the third-party defendant, could not initiate
a claim against the third-party defendant. See infra notes 321-327 and accompanying text.
25. This means that a court has no federal subject matter jurisdiction over a claim until
the contrary is proven. Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 11 (1799); see 13
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRocDURa: JURISDICTION, supra note 8, § 3522, at 60. In contrast,
state courts are forums of general jurisdiction, and thus enjoy a presumption of subject matter
jurisdiction over a particular controversy unless a contrary showing is made. See 13 FEDIERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION,
26. U.S. CONsT. art. III.

supra note 8, § 3522, at 60.

27. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2 provides that:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
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limit federal judicial power by providing that Congress has the power
to establish lower federal courts 28 and impose limitations and conditions on federal judicial power.29 Thus, in determining whether it
has the "power" to hear a particular case, a federal court must refer
both to the Constitution and to the statutes that define federal jurisdiction .o
Federal courts developed the doctrines of pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction in order to deal with the increasing complexity of litigation. In the absence of a federal statute conferring supplemental
jurisdiction, 31 the federal courts have invoked these doctrines to exert
jurisdiction over nonfederal claims that are sufficiently related to one
or more federal claims. 32 Justification for this extension of federal
judicial power has focused on the boundaries of the constitutional
''Case.'

33

The basic premise behind both pendent and ancillary jurisdiction
can be traced to Osborn v. United States Bank.3 4 There, Chief Justice
Marshall announced the general proposition that a federal court has
jurisdiction over the entire case. 35 Federal courts exercising supplemade, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between
two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between
Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under the Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof,
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 ("The Congress shall have Power . .. To constitute
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court"), and art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.").
29. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 ("the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction
...
with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make").
30. See Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513 (1868); Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S.
(6 Wall.) 247, 252 (1867). The Supreme Court asserted over a century ago that as
regards all courts of the United States inferior to [the Supreme Court], two things
The Constitution must have given to the
are necessary to create jurisdiction ....
To
court the capacity to take it, and an act of Congress must have supplied it ....
the extent that such action is not taken, the power lies dormant.
Cooper, 73 U.S. at 252. The Supreme Court presently adheres to this principle. See, e.g.,
Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 548 (1989) (citing Cooper).
31. In 28 U.S.C. § 1338, Congress explicitly authorized supplemental jurisdiction over
state unfair competition claims in cases arising under federal copyright, patent, and trademark
laws. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b). Prior to the enactment of § 1367, this was the only statute in
which Congress explicitly conferred federal supplemental jurisdiction.
32. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (pendent jurisdiction); Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926) (ancillary jurisdiction).
33. U.S. CoNsT. art III, § 2. See, e.g., Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
34. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
35. Id. at 821-23. See also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 554 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.,
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mental jurisdiction have sought a rational balance between preserving

constitutional jurisdiction limitations and resolving all disputes arising
from one set of facts in a single action.3 6 Focus on the latter goal has
resulted in the liberal application of the doctrines with courts emphasizing judicial economy, fairness to litigants, and access to federal
37

forums.
Despite their common origin and purpose, the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction evolved separately.3 8 Courts generally
have distinguished between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction by finding that "pendent" claims are nonfederal claims asserted by the plaintiff in her complaint, 39 while "ancillary" claims are nonfederal claims

added after the plaintiff files the complaint. 40 This distinction led to
divergent standards as to when a federal court could exercise pendent
or ancillary jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court brought these doctrines closer together in Aldinger v. Howard4' and Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger42
when it adopted a uniform analysis for the exercise of supplemental
dissenting), in which Justice Rehnquist stated: "No subsequent decision has cast any doubt
upon the wisdom of Chief Justice Marshall's expositions in [Osborn], since a different result
would have forced substantial federal cases into state courts for adjudication simply because
they involved nonfederal issues as well as federal ones."
36. E.g., Lesnik v. Public Indus. Corp., 144 F.2d 968, 973-74 (2d Cir. 1944); Moncrief
v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 73 F. Supp. 815, 816 (E.D. Pa. 1947); see also 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: JuRs IcToN, supra note 8, § 3523, at 115.
37. See infra notes 205-207, 257-260 and accompanying text.
38. See Matasar, Rediscovering "One Constitutional Case," supra note 17, at 1411;
Perdue, supra note 12, it541-42.
39. The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction is divided into two sub-categories: pendent-claim
and pendent-party jurisdiction. Pendent-claim jurisdiction allows a plaintiff to join a factually
related state claim to a federal claim in the absence of diversity. See United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); infra Part I.A. Its primary, though not exclusive, application
is joinder of claims under FE. R. Crv. P. 18. Pendent-party jurisdiction allows a plaintiff
with a federal claim against one defendant to assert a factually related state claim against an
additional, nondiverse defendant. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 6 (1976); infra Part
I.B. As defined by the Supreme Court, pendent-party jurisdiction is "jurisdiction over parties
not named in any claim that is independently cognizable by the federal court." Finley v.
United States, 490 U.S. 545, 549 (1989).
40. See, e.g., Corporacion Venezolano de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 477 F. Supp.
615, 622 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Mengler, supra note 8, at 247-48; Perdue, supra note 12, at
541-42. The distinction made between the two doctrines, however, is not always consistent.
Id. See, e.g., Jacobs v. United States, 367 F. Supp. 1275, 1277 (D. Ariz. 1973) (characterizing
pendent jurisdiction as a subset of ancillary jurisdiction).
41. 427 U.S. 1 (1976). Although technically a pendent jurisdiction case, Aldinger has been
relied upon in cases delineating the scope of ancillary jurisdiction. E.g., Owen Equip. &
Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-73, 374, 379-80 (1978).
42. 437 U.S. 365. Although finding it unnecessary to determine whether any principled
differences exist between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, the Court noted that both doctrines
addressed the issue of when a federal court may exercise extra-jurisdictional power. Id. at 370.
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jurisdiction.4 1 In Kroger, the Court recognized that pendent and ancillary jurisdiction are essentially "two species of the same generic
problem: Under what circumstances may a federal court hear and decide a state-law claim arising between citizens of the same State?" 44
Aldinger and Kroger, however, left many questions unanswered.

Moreover, most lower federal courts were reluctant to follow the Supreme Court's lead in uniformity. 45 Thus, the Court's creation of a

uniform theoretical framework was ineffective at eliminating the inconsistent application of these two doctrines.
A.

Pendent Jurisdiction

As discussed previously, the judicial development of pendent jurisdiction can be traced to Osborn v. United States Bank,46 in which

the Supreme Court announced that a federal court has jurisdiction
47 Over the next century
over the entire case before it.
and a half the
Court worked to define and limit the boundaries of the doctrine. 48 In
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs 49 the Supreme Court unanimously refined and dramatically relaxed the requirements for pendent jurisdic5
tion. 0 Today Gibbs is synonymous with pendent jurisdiction. 1
The standard articulated in Gibbs allows federal courts to exercise

pendent jurisdiction whenever the plaintiff's nonfederal claim(s) are
so related to the principal federal claim(s) that the entire action comprises "one constitutional 'case."' 52 This power is based on the implied
43. See Note, Toward a Theory of Incidental Jurisdiction, supra note 21; Comment,
Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Toward a Synthesis of Two Doctrines, 22 UCLA L. REv.
1263, 1280 (1975) (authored by William D. Claster) [hereinafter Comment, Toward a Synthesis
of Two Doctrines]; infra Part I.D.
44. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 370.
45. See Note, Developing a Unified Approach, supra note 5, at 532.
46. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822-23 (1824).
47. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
48. See, e.g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909); Hum
v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 246 (1933).
49. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
50. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 349 (1988) ("The [Gibbs] Court
intended this standard not only to clarify, but also to broaden, the scope of federal pendent
jurisdiction."). See generally Note, UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HARv. L.
REv. 657 (1968) (detailed discussion of the Gibbs decision).
51. See, e.g., Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 548-49 (1989) (discussion of Gibbs
as the seminal case for pendent jurisdiction); Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 484 U.S. at 348-49
(asserting that the modern doctrine of pendent jurisdiction stems from Gibbs).
52. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725. To determine when federal courts should exercise pendent
jurisdiction, the Court provided a two-prong "power-discretion" test. See Note, Toward a
Theory of Incidental Jurisdiction, supra note 21, at 1937; Comment, Toward A Synthesis of
Two Doctrines, supra note 43, at 1271-72. The "power prong" requires that the court determine
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constitutional authority to exercise jurisdiction over the entire case
under Article III.53 Elaborating on this standard, the Gibbs Court

enumerated three criteria to determine when jurisdictional power exists:
The federal claim must have substance to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court. The state and federal claims must derive from
a common nucleus of operative fact. But if, considered without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such
that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial
proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there
is power in federal courts to hear the whole. 54

First, the plaintiff must plead a substantial federal claim "to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court." 55 Logically, if the federal
claim is unsubstantial, it defeats the court's jurisdiction at the outset,
and thus the court lacks the power to exercise pendent jurisdiction over
a related nonfederal claim. 56 This first requirement has created little
controversy for courts or commentators and has been defined "with
'57
sufficient clarity."

Both the second and third criteria of the Gibbs standard demand
a sufficient connection between the federal and nonfederal claims before a federal court may hear the nonfederal claim: The second criwhether the claims comprise one "constitutional case." Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
Under the "discretion prong," the court uses its discretion to deny jurisdiction when
circumstances warrant restraint. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. Factors considered by courts include
judicial economy, procedural convenience, fairness to litigants, comity with state tribunals,
predominance of state issues, and possibility of jury confusion. Id. at 726-27. See, e.g.,
Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 484 U.S. at 351 (holding that under pendent jurisdiction, federal courts
have the discretion to remand a properly removed case to state court when all federal claims
have been eliminated); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 716 (1973) (holding that
the district court appropriately considered the unsettled nature of state law and the likelihood
of jury confusion in deciding not to exercise pendent jurisdiction); see also Baker, Toward a
Relaxed View of FederalAncillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 33 U. PrrT. L. Rv. 759, 76567 (1972) (discussing the discretionary prong of the Gibbs test); Schenkier, supra note 9, at
289-305 (extensively discussing each factor in the discretionary prong of the Gibbs test).
Analysis of the "discretionary prong" is beyond the scope of this Note.
53. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
54. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
55. Id. The definition of a substantial federal claim is stated in Levering & Garrigues Co.
v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103 (1933):
[J]urisdiction, as distinguished from merits, is wanting where the claim set forth in
the pleading is plainly unsubstantial ... either because [it is] obviously without
merit, or "because its unsoundness so clearly results from the previous decisions of
[the Supreme C]ourt as to foreclose the subject and leave no room for the inference
that the questions sought to be raised can be the subject of controversy.
Id. at 105-06 (quoting Hannis Distilling Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285, 288 (1910)).
The Gibbs Court relied on this definition for its analysis. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
56. See Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 244-45 (1933) (noting that if the court has no
jurisdiction over the federal claim, it has no jurisdiction over the related nonfederal claim).
57. Schenkier, supra note 9, at 262.
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terion requires "a common nucleus of operative fact" between the
federal and nonfederal claims; the third criterion requires that the claims
ordinarily would be tried in one judicial proceeding. 8 Courts have
been inconsistent, however, in determining the extent of the relation
necessary to bring the nonfederal claim within their pendent power. 9
Some courts focus on the degree of factual overlap between the claims,
while adopting differing guidelines of fact relatedness: some requiring
only a "loose factual connection" between the claims;60 others requiring a substantial, and sometimes complete, factual overlap. 61 Still
other courts focus less on whether a formula of factual relatedness
has been satisfied, and instead concentrate on whether it would save
the litigants time and effort if the claims were tried together.6 2 These
courts have adopted a transactional approach to pendent jurisdiction,
58.
59.

Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
See Matasar, Rediscovering "One Constitutional Case," supra note 17, at 1453;
Schenkier, supra note 9, at 261-63, 268-71; 6A C. WRIO-T, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1588, at 535-57 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL. PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: CivIL]. But see Mengler, supra note 8, at 273 (contending that federal courts
have been "reasonably consistent" in their application of Gibbs).
60. See 13B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION, supra note 8, § 3567.1,
at 117 (stating that the Gibbs test only requires a "loose factual connection"). This standard
has been cited by many courts as stating the rule of law. E.g., Doe v. Bobbitt, 682 F. Supp.
388, 389-90 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Wicker v. First Fin. of La. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 665 F. Supp.
1210, 1213 (M.D. La. 1987); Ritter v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 593 F. Supp. 1279, 1281
(D. Colo. 1984); Frye v. Pioneer Logging Mach., Inc., 555 F. Supp. 730, 732 (D.S.C. 1983)
(asserting that "[o]nly when the state law claim is totally different from the federal claim is
there no power to hear the state claim").
61. See Mason v. Richmond Motor Co., 625 F. Supp. 883, 886 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff'd
825 F.2d 407 (4th Cir. 1987), expressly rejecting the more liberal approach:
I think the respective judges have misread Gibbs. In so doing they have expanded
federal jurisdiction beyond the Gibbs limit. Only Congress is empowered to expand
the jurisdiction of the district courts. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Accordingly, I must
decline to follow the judges' lead. In particular, I must take exception to the concept
that only a "loose factual connection" between the federal and State claims is
required to empower the federal courts to exercise pendent jurisdiction. A fortiori,
I wholly disagree ... that jurisdiction exists in such cases unless the facts in the
State and federal claims are "totally different." I think that a plain reading of the
language in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs illustrates why such an interpretation is
fallacious. I think that this progression from "common nucleus" to "totally different" is a paradigm of judicial lawmaking.
1d.; see also Wilder v. Irvin, 423 F. Supp. 639, 642-43 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (although admitting
that factual overlap existed between the state and federal claim, the court refused to exercise
pendent jurisdiction because "[t]he state claim will certainly not be proven by the evidence
that will be offered on behalf of the federal claim.").
62. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. O'Neil, 523 F.2d 1057, 1062-63 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (arguing pendent jurisdiction would be proper because the nonfederal claim arose
out of the same transaction as the federal claim), aff'd on reh'g en banc, 545 F.2d 1059 (7th
Cir. 1976); Blake v. Town of Del. City, 441 F. Supp. 1189, 1204 (D. Del. 1977) (holding that
the court had the power to exercise jurisdiction because "one would expect the state and
federal law claims to be tried together in a single judicial proceeding").
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requiring only the loosest connection between the federal and non63

federal claims.
Additionally, courts have been inconsistent in the relative importance they have placed on the second and third criteria. 64 Although
the two criteria are almost universally accepted as independent and

cumulative, 65 satisfaction of the "common nucleus" inquiry usually
satisfies the single trial expectancy prong as well." Generally, courts

either have ignored the third requirement, or simply have cited the
language without analysis. 67
Because of the inconsistency in the doctrine's application coupled
with the concern that courts are exceeding their limited jurisdiction,
some commentators have criticized the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction
as "an anomalous-and dangerous-principle of federal jurisdiction. "6 Nevertheless, the prevailing view is that pendent jurisdiction

is a necessary exercise of federal judicial power. 69
63. Id. See, e.g., Kimbrough, 523 F.2d at 1062-63; Blake, 441 F. Supp. at 1204. See also
Schenkier, supra note 9, at 268-75 (arguing that a transactional approach is more consistent
with the purposes behind pendent jurisdiction).
64. Schenkier, supra note 9, at 262. Compare Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger,
437 U.S. 365, 372 (1978) (describing the Gibbs test simply as "a finding that federal and
nonfederal claims arise from 'a common nucleus of operative fact.') with Aldinger v. Howard,
427 U.S. 1, 20 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that "the question of Art. III power
in the federal judiciary to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction concerns whether the claims
asserted are such as 'would ordinarily be expected to [be tried] in one judicial proceeding').
65. Matasar, Rediscovering "One Constitutional Case," supra note 17, at 1459 & n.282;
13 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURIsDIcTIoN, supra note 8, § 3567.1, at 116. At least
one commentator, however, has read the second and third requirements not as cumulative,
but as alternatives. Baker, supra note 52, at 764-65 (contending that the third requirement is
"an exception or alternative to the second requirement of a 'common nucleus of operative
fact'); see also Blake v. Town of Del. City, 441 F. Supp. 1189, 1203.04 (D. Del. 1977)
(asserting that the second requirement for the exercise of pendent jurisdiction is that "the
state and federal claims must 'derive from a common nucleus of operative fact' or be such
that a plaintiff 'would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding"')
(emphasis added). But see Schenkier, supra note 9, at 268 (rejecting this interpretation because
it "would render the 'common nucleus' standard essentially meaningless").
66. Miller, supra note 8,at 3; Schenkier, supra note 9, at 262-63. See, e.g., New WatchDog Comm. v. New York City Taxi Drivers Union, 438 F. Supp. 1242, 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
67. Matasar, A Pendent and Ancillary JurisdictionPrimer,supra note 17, at 138; Mengler,
supra note 8, at 274; Miller, supra note 8, at 3; see also Comment, Toward a Synthesis of
Two Doctrines, supra note 43, at 1272 (referring to the Gibbs standard as a "two-part test,"
ignoring the third criterion).
68. Schenkier, supra note 9, at 248. See Comment, Aldinger v. Howard and Pendent
Jurisdiction, 77 CoLum. L. REv. 127, 134-35 (1977) (authored by Geoffrey P. Miller); Note,
The Concept of Law-Tied Pendent Jurisdiction: Gibbs and Aldinger Reconsidered, 87 YALE
L.J. 627, 646-48 (1978).
69. See, e.g, Baker, supra note 52; Mengler, supra note 8, at 247-48; Miller, supra note
8; 13B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION, supra note 8, at § 3567, at 107.
But see infra notes 250-255 and accompanying text discussing Finley.
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The Question of Pendent-Party Jurisdiction

The Gibbs decision had the potential to greatly expand the scope
of pendent jurisdiction. The Gibbs Court had observed that "[u]nder
the [Federal] Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest
possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties: joinder
of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged. ' 70 Seizing on
the Court's reference to the joinder of parties, many courts applied
the Gibbs doctrine to justify the exercise of "pendent-party jurisdiction. " 71 Pendent-party jurisdiction permits a plaintiff with a federal
claim against one defendant to assert a factually related nonfederal
72
claim against an additional, nondiverse defendant.
Federal courts originally applied pendent-party jurisdiction in a
range of contexts. 73 For example, courts invoked pendent-party jurisdiction in diversity cases when diversity of citizenship existed between the plaintiff and one defendant but not between the plaintiff
and another defendant. 74 This use of pendent-party jurisdiction was
implicitly rejected by the Supreme Court's rationale in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger. 7 The Court reasoned that extending
jurisdiction in such cases encouraged the circumvention of the com70. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966) (emphasis added).
71. See 13B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURIsDICTION, supra note 8, § 3567.2,
at 148-51; Note, UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HARv. L. Rav. 657, 662-64
(1968).
72. Generally, a plaintiff's ability to join third parties is governed by FED. R. Civ. P.
20. But see infra Part I.C.(2) (discussion of impleader and compulsory joinder). Federal Rule
20(a) permits the joinder of defendants when a claim asserted against them relates to or arises
out of the same transaction or occurrence as the main claim, and there is some common
question of law or fact between or among the parties who are to be joined and those already
in the suit. FED. R. CIrv. P. 20(a).
Federal Rule 20(a) also permits the joinder of plaintiffs under similar circumstances. See id.
However, federal courts have not permitted pendent-party jurisdiction in this context. See,
e.g., Acton Co. v. Bachman Foods, Inc., 668 F.2d 76, 79-80 (1st Cir. 1982). Extending pendent
jurisdiction to the joinder of a plaintiff pursuant to Federal Rule 20, as opposed to basing
jurisdiction on a federal question or diversity, would permit the plaintiff to avoid completely
federal jurisdictional requirements. To allow this would ignore the federal courts' limited
jurisdiction. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
It should be noted that some courts have referred to the joinder of parties under Federal
Rule 20 as coming within the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. See, e.g., Schulman v. Huck
Finn, Inc. 472 F.2d 864, 866-67 (8th Cir. 1973); Jacobs v. United States, 367 F. Supp. 1275,
1277 (D. Ariz. 1973).
73. 13B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION, supra note 8, § 3567.2, at
148-51.
74. See id. Because of the complete diversity requirement, see supra note 21, if one
plaintiff and one defendant are from the same state, a federal court must rely on pendentparty jurisdiction to hear the state claim between the nondiverse parties.
75. 437 U.S. 365 (1978). See 13B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION,
supra note 8, § 3567.2, at 150 n.12.
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plete diversity requirement. 76 Additionally, courts exercised pendentparty jurisdiction in federal question cases where a state claim asserted
against a nondiverse defendant was closely related to a federal claim
7
asserted against another defendant.
It was in the context of federal question jurisdiction that the Supreme Court first directly addressed the issue of pendent-party jurisdiction. In Aldinger v. Howard,78 Ms. Aldinger sought to assert state
claims against a county in her federal civil rights action against some
of the county's officials.7 9 The different claims clearly arose out of
a common nucleus of operative fact because the state law claims against
the county were based solely on the county's vicarious liability arising
from its officials' tortious conduct. Since diversity did not exist between the plaintiff and the county, a state-claim defendant, an independent basis of federal jurisdiction was not established. s0 Ms.
Aldinger argued that, based on pendent jurisdiction and the use of
ancillary jurisdiction to add parties, her request for the court to exercise pendent-party jurisdiction would satisfy the Gibbs test on its
face. 8 The Court rejected Ms. Aldinger's contention, refusing to formulate any "general, all-encompassing jurisdictional rule" regarding
82
the use of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.
The Court distinguished pendent-claim from pendent-party jurisdiction. It asserted that "[t]he situation with respect to the joining
of a new party ... strikes us as being both factually and legally different from the situation facing the Court in Gibbs and its predecessors."'83 The Court explained:
From a purely factual point of view, it is one thing to authorize two
parties, already present in federal court by virtue of a case over which
76. See Kroger, 437 U.S. at 374-77; see also Bratton, Pendent Jurisdiction in Diversity
Cases-Some Doubts, 11 SAN DIEo L. REv. 296, 300-18 (1974) (questioning the applicability
of pendent-party jurisdiction in diversity cases).
77. See, e.g., Schulman v. Huck Finn, Inc., 472 F.2d 864, 866 (8th Cir. 1973); Leather's
Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 809 (2d Cir. 1971); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins.

Co. v. Craton, 405 F.2d 41, 48 (5th Cir. 1968); see also 13B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDtRE: JurasDICTioN, supra note 8, § 3567.2, at 150-51 & n.13.
78. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
79. Id. at 4-5.
80. The accepted interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 at the time of the Aldinger decision
was that a municipal corporation was not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983, and thus
a plaintiff could not assert a federal civil rights claim against a country. Id. at 16 (citing
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled sub nom. Monell v. New York City Dep't
of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)); see infra note 86.
81. Id. at 12-13. This request was not so very unusual because prior to Aldinger, lower
federal courts allowed such an exercise of pendent jurisdiction. See supra note 77 and
accompanying text.
82. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 13.
83. Id. at 14.
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the court has jurisdiction, to litigate in addition to their federal claim
a state-law claim over which there is no independent basis of federal
jurisdiction. But it is quite another thing to permit a plaintiff, who
has asserted a claim against one defendant with respect to which there
is federal jurisdiction, to join an entirely different defendant on the
basis of a state-law claim over which there is no independent basis
of federal jurisdiction, simply because his claim against the first defendant and his claim against the second defendant "derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact." . . . [T]he addition of a completely new party would run counter to the well-established principle
that federal courts, as opposed to state trial courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out by Congress . 4
Because the federal and state courts had concurrent jurisdiction over
the federal claims, the Court found that the efficiency of resolving the
controversy in a single lawsuit could be achieved by suing in state court,
where the state and federal claims could be joined. 85
The Court also discussed the significant legal difference between
pendent-claim and pendent-party jurisdiction. It stressed that the addition of parties, as opposed to the addition of claims, created unique
statutory jurisdictional considerations:
In Osborn and Gibbs Congress was silent on the extent to which
the defendant, already properly in federal court under a statute, might
be called upon to answer nonfederal questions or claims; the way was
thus left open for the Court to fashion its own rules under the general
language of Art. III. But the extension of Gibbs to this kind of
"pendent party" jurisdiction-bringing in an additional defendant
at the behest of the plaintiff-presents rather different statutory jurisdictional considerations. Petitioner's contention ... must be decided, not in the context of congressional silence or tacit
encouragement, but in quite the opposite context. The question here,
which it was not necessary to address in Gibbs or Osborn, is whether
by virtue of the statutory grant of subject-matter jurisdiction, upon
which petitioner's principal claim against the treasurer rests, Congress has addressed itself to the party as to whom jurisdiction pendent6
to the principal claim is sought. And it undoubtedly has done so.
Thus, the Supreme Court in Aldinger for the first time focused
on the need for a statutory basis for pendent jurisdiction, at least when
additional parties were involved. This analysis added an additional
inquiry under the "power prong" of the Gibbs analysis. Before a federal court may exercise pendent-party jurisdiction, the Court held that
it must determine whether "Congress in the statutes conferring ju84. Id.at 14-15 (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 15.

86. Id.at 15-16.
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risdiction has not expressly or by implication negated its existence. 87

In other words, federal courts could exercise pendent-party jurisdiction unless Congress had denied jurisdiction. Under its new analytical
framework, the Court found that Congress had excluded counties from

liability in section 1983, and thus, "the scope of that 'civil action'...
should not be so broadly read as to bring [counties] back within [the
court's jurisdictional] power merely because the facts also
give rise to
'88
an ordinary civil action against them under state law."
The Aldinger opinion intentionally was narrowly written. 9 The
Court did not allow the exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction in this
context, but in dicta it left open the possibility that exclusive federal

jurisdiction in itself might be enough to permit jurisdiction. 9° Additionally, even though the facts of Aldinger created the possibility for
a broad-sweeping decision, the Court avoided a decision on the relationship between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction: "Given the
87. Id. at 18. Although the Aldinger statutory inquiry may be considered a third prong
to the Gibbs "power-discretion" test, it may be viewed more appropriately as a fourth step
under the "power prong." See supra note 52. In determining whether a federal court has the
power to exercise pendent-party jurisdiction, the court must ask four questions: (1) Whether
there is a substantial federal claim, United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966);
(2) whether the state and federal claims arise from "a common nucleus of operative fact,"
id.; (3) whether the state and federal claims would ordinarily be tried in one judicial proceeding,
id.; and (4) whether Congress has expressly or implicitly negated its existence in the jurisdictional
statute, Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18. The first three inquiries relate to the constitutional authorization to exercise jurisdiction. The final inquiry relates to the statutory authorization.
88. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 17 (emphasis in original). Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961),
served as the basis for the Aldinger holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) implicitly negated the
exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction over a state claim against a county. Monroe was overruled
two years after Aldinger in Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658,
663 (1978). This ruling, however, does not qualify the Aldinger holding that the jurisdictional
questions presented are statutory as well as constitutional, "a point on which the dissenters in
Aldinger agreed." Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 n.12 (1978).
89. See Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18 ("we decide here only the issue of so-called 'pendent
party' jurisdiction with respect to a claim brought under §§ 1343(3) and 1983").
90. Id. ("When the grant of jurisdiction to a federal court is exclusive, for example, as
in the prosecution of tort claims against the United States ... the argument of judicial
economy and convenience can be coupled with the additional argument that only in federal
court may all the claims be tried together."). Claims within the exclusive jurisdiction of federal
courts include those under the federal antitrust laws, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(a), 26 (1988), patent
laws, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988), securities laws, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988), admiralty laws, 28
U.S.C. § 1333 (1988); and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
Most courts after Aldinger, in accordance with this dicta, allowed the joinder of pendent
parties when they had exclusive federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Lykins v. Pointer, Inc., 725
F.2d 645, 647 (11th Cir. 1984) (action brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act); In re Oil
Spill by the Amoco Cadiz Off the Coast of France, 699 F.2d 909, 913-14 (7th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983) (case in admiralty); Dick Meyers Towing Serv., Inc. v.
United States, 577 F.2d 1023, 1024 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1978) (Federal
Tort Claims Act action); Lee Const. Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 558 F. Supp. 165, 170-72
(D. Md. 1982) (action brought against the Federal Reserve Bank).
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complexities of the many manifestations of federal jurisdiction, ...
there is little profit in attempting to decide . . . whether there are any
'principled' differences between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction; or,
if there are, what effect Gibbs had on such differences." 9' Thus, Aldinger left open the question of whether the statutory inquiry required
for pendent-party jurisdiction is also required for pendent-claim and
ancillary jurisdiction.
C. Ancillary Jurisdiction
Although the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction arose
from the same source, 92 the development of ancillary jurisdiction has
followed a different course. 93 The modem scope of ancillary jurisdiction originated in Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange.94 In Moore,
the Court seemed to authorize broad-based ancillary jurisdiction over
any nonfederal claims with a close factual connection to the pending
federal claims. 95 Emphasis was placed "not so much upon the im96
mediateness of [the] connection as upon [the] logical relationship."
The major expansion of ancillary jurisdiction, however, occurred after
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 97 Although Federal Rule 82 explicitly states that the Rules "shall not be construed
to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts,' ' 9
in practice the content of a federal "civil action" has been broadened
by the joinder devices available under the Federal Rules. 9 This development has led some commentators to view ancillary jurisdiction
as a by-product of the Federal Rules. 10°
91. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 13.
92. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
93. Originally, ancillary jurisdiction was restricted essentially to situations of necessity.
See Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Hozier, 267 U.S. 276, 280 (1925); Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24
How.) 450, 459-60 (1860) (ancillary jurisdiction in cases involving claims to property within
the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction); see also 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
JURISDICTION, supra note 8, § 3523, at 87-89, 93-94 (discussing ancillary jurisdiction in instances
of virtual necessity).
94. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
95. Id. at 609-10.
96. Id. at 610; see also infra notes 105-109 and accompanying text (discussing the "logical
relationship" approach to defining ancillary jurisdiction limitations).
97. See Brandt v. Olson, 179 F. Supp. 363, 370 (N.D. Iowa 1959); Baker, supra note 52,
at 759; Note, Ancillary Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 48 IowA L. Rav. 383, 385 (1963).
98. FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
99. In fact, the joinder rules would lose much of their practical utility if ancillary
jurisdiction were not available. See Brandt, 179 F. Supp. at 370; 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION, supra note 8, § 3523, at 94-95.
100. See Goldberg, The Influence of ProceduralRules on FederalJurisdiction, 28 STAN.
L. REv. 395, 418-20 (1976); Miller, supra note 8, at 5; Perdue, supra note 12, at 544.
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Like the inconsistency found in the interpretations of a "pen-

dent" claim under the Gibbs analysis,101 case law offers little direction
as to what constitutes an "ancillary" claim.'0 Generally, courts have
labeled a nonfederal claim "ancillary" when it arises out of "the same
transaction[s] or occurrence[s]," as the main federal claim. 0 3 This concept, however, has never been clearly defined.' 4
Many courts adopting a liberal approach hold that claims arise
from the same transaction or occurrence when there exists a "logical

relationship" between the federal and nonfederal claim. 0 5 Even this
approach, however, has not been interpreted consistently. The Fifth

Circuit, for example, has held that a "logical relationship" is found
only if the claims arise from "the same aggregate of operative facts"

or if "the aggregate core of facts upon which the original claim rests
activates additional legal rights in a party defendant that would other-

wise be dormant." 1 °6 In contrast, the Third Circuit has found a "log101. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (finding
"no clear or systematic limitation on, or definitions of, ancillary jurisdiction"); Walmac Co.
v. Isaacs, 220 F.2d 108, 113 (1st Cir. 1955) (noting that "ancillary jurisdiction is not capable
of exact definition"); Lesnik v. Public Indus. Corp., 144 F.2d 968, 974 (2d Cir. 1944)
(criticizing ancillary jurisdiction as "amorphous"); Brandt, 179 F. Supp. at 370 ("examination
and re-examination disclosed to many ... courts that their ancillary jurisdiction was much
broader and much more elastic than it had previously been understood to be").
103. See Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593, 609-10 (1926); see also
Glens Falls Indem. Co. v. United States, 229 F.2d 370, 373-74 (9th Cir. 1956); Schenkier,
supra note 9, at 278 n.170 (noting that "Moore has been construed as creating a 'transactional'
test for the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction").
104. See 7 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL, supra note 59, § 1653, at 382 (noting
that most courts have used a case-by-case approach in determining whether the joinder of
parties should be permitted, rather than adopting generalized formulas to determine what
factual relationships are considered the same transaction or occurrence).
The definition of what constitutes a "transaction or occurrence" is generally used by the
court to limit ancillary jurisdiction. Compare Lasa per L'Industria del Marmo Societa per
Azioni v. Southern Builders, Inc., 45 F.R.D. 435, 440 (W.D. Tenn. 1967) (narrowly defining
transaction as the specific contract between the plaintiff and defendant) with the Sixth Circuit
opinion reversing it, Lasa per L'Industria del Marmo Societa per Azioni v. Alexander, 414
F.2d 143, 147 (6th Cir. 1969) (defining transaction as all disputes arising out of the construction
project involved). Thus, although the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction is discretionary, see,
e.g., Chelsey v. Union Carbide Corp., 927 F.2d 60, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1991), courts rarely decline
to extend jurisdiction. See 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDUREi: JURISDICTION, supra note
8, § 3523, at 105-06.
105. This approach was first expressed in Moore, 270 U.S. at 610, when the Court stated:
'Transaction' is a word of flexible meaning. It may comprehend a series of many occurrences,
depending not so much upon the immediateness of their connection as upon their logical
relationship." Id. (emphasis added). See also United Artists Corp. v. Masterpiece Prod., Inc.,
221 F.2d 213, 216 (2d Cir. 1955) (citing and quoting Moore, 270 U.S. at 610); Mengler, supra
note 8, at 274 n.132 (noting that the "arising 'out of the transaction or occurrence' language
of the Federal Rules requires a "logical relationship'.').
106. Revere Corp. & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709, 715 (5th
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ical relationship" when duplicate litigation would result from separate

trials on each claim. 0 7 The Third Circuit formulation is far broader
than the Fifth Circuit's. The Fifth Circuit requires a substantial overlap of facts between or among the claims, 0 8 whereas the Third Circuit

focuses on considerations of judicial economy and convenience. 3 9 Some
courts have criticized the "logical relationship" test as being overly
broad in scope and uncertain in its application." 0 Such criticism, however, probably depends upon which interpretation of "logical relationship" the court relies.
Some lower federal courts have adopted alternative approaches
to the "logical relationship" definition of the "same transaction or
occurrence" test. These approaches include the "identity of issues"
test,"' the "identity of evidence" test," 2 and the "res judicata" test.",
Cir. 1970). This approach is reminiscent of the strict interpretation of the Gibbs "common
nucleus of operative fact" requirement. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
107. Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631, 634 (3d Cir. 1961).
This approach is similar to the Gibbs single trial expectancy requirement. See supra notes 5867 and accompanying text.
108. See Revere Corp. & Brass, Inc., 426 F.2d at 715.
109. See Great Lakes Rubber Corp., 286 F.2d at 634; see also Newburger, Loeb & Co. v.
Gross, 563 F.2d 1057 (2d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978), in which the Second
Circuit held:
Since a compulsory counterclaim is by definition closely related to the subject matter
of the opposing party's claims, common sense and judicial economy compel the
conclusion that such claims should be tried together and the extension of ancillary
jurisdiction ... is consistent with Article III's grant of jurisdiction over "cases"
arising under the Constitution and federal laws.
Id. at 1071; Lasa per L'Industria del Marmo Societa per Azioni v. Alexander, 414 F.2d 143,
147 (6th Cir. 1969) (interpreting "logical relationship," and thus "transaction or occurrence"
liberally "in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation"); Albright v. Gates, 362 F.2d 928, 929
(9th Cir. 1966) (noting that "transaction" must be liberally construed, and emphasizing the
avoidance of duplicating judicial effort).
110. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 384 F. Supp.
600, 603 (D. Mass. 1974).
111. Under this test, ancillary jurisdiction is exercised when the issues of fact and law
between two claims are similar enough to arise from the same transaction or occurrence. See,
e.g., Whigham v. Beneficial Fin. Co. of Fayetteville, 599 F.2d 1322, 1323 (4th Cir. 1979);
Connecticut Indem. Co. v. Lee, 168 F.2d 420, 423 (1st Cir. 1948). Although a complete
overlap of law and fact is not required, this strict test has the potential to narrow the scope
of ancillary jurisdiction.
112. Under the identity of evidence approach, courts will exercise ancillary jurisdiction
when the evidence needed to establish the two claims is substantially the same. See, e.g.,
Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Security Nat'l Bank, 525 F.2d 620, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1975); NonFerrous Metals v. Saramar Aluminum Co., 25 F.R.D. 102, 105 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
113. Under the res judicata approach, the court determines whether res judicata would bar
the party from raising the nonfederal claim in a subsequent state court suit. See, e.g., Beach
v. KDI Corp., 490 F.2d 1312, 1314 (3d Cir. 1974); Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. Sylvania
Indus. Corp., 154 F.2d 814, 818 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 859
(1946). In the case of ancillary jurisdiction over an additional party, the relevant issue is
whether the nonparty is bound by the judgment entered in her absence.
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Although these tests apply in a minority of jurisdictions, they have
added greatly to the confusion surrounding the application of ancillary
jurisdiction.
In Owen Equipment and Erection Co. v. Kroger,1 14 the Supreme
Court introduced another approach for determining whether to exercise ancillary jurisdiction over additional parties. The Court asserted
that for a nonfederal claim to be "ancillary" it had to be logically
dependent on the main federal claim.1 15 A nonfederal claim is logically
dependent on a federal claim when it relies upon the outcome, not
the source, of the federal claim.116 This formulation appears to be unduly restrictive and commentators have found the logical dependence
reasoning to be flawed.117 Compulsory counterclaims and cross-claims,
for example, are not always logically dependent on the resolution of
the plaintiff's claim, yet they universally are recognized as falling within
the federal courts' ancillary jurisdiction.1
Independent of the confusion surrounding the appropriate standard for the use of ancillary jurisdiction, unique problems have arisen
in the application of ancillary jurisdiction to the Federal Rules' joinder
provisions. The relevant contexts include: counterclaims and crossclaims, impleader, and compulsory party joinder and intervention.
(1) Ancillary Jurisdiction Over Counterclaims and Cross-Claims
Notwithstanding the confusion surrounding the definition of an
"ancillary" claim, the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over nonfederal claims between existing parties has created universally accepted
rules. First, ancillary jurisdiction has been used by courts to hear compulsory counterclaims pursuant to Federal Rule 13(a). 1 19 Under Federal
114. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
115. Id. at 376.
116. See id. An example is when a defendant impleads a third party who "is or may be
liable for all or part of the plaintiff's claim" against the defendant. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
117. See, e.g., Freer, supra note 17, at 70; Matasar, A Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction
Primer, supra note 17, at 171-72.
118. Id. See 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION, supra note 8, § 3523,
at 101-02 (arguing that federal courts should downplay the "logical dependence" factor of the
Kroger ancillary jurisdiction analysis because compulsory counterclaims and cross-claims are
not always "logically dependent").
119. A counterclaim is any affirmative claim for relief usually asserted by the defendant,
in the defensive pleadings against an opposing party, usually the plaintiff. FED. R. Civ. P.
13(a). See, e.g., Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 714-15 (1973). The universal
acceptance of ancillary jurisdiction in the context of Federal Rule 13(a) has included counterclaims that are compulsory to other compulsory counterclaims. See, e.g., Great Lakes Rubber
Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631, 633 (3d Cir. 1961) (exercise of ancillary jurisdiction
over plaintiff's compulsory counterclaim to defendant's federal counterclaim was proper).
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Rule 13(a), a counterclaim is compulsory if it "arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject of the opposing party's

claim."'120 Because a nonfederal claim is "ancillary" when it arises out
2
of "the same transaction or occurrence" as the main federal claim,1 '
by definition, federal courts may exercise ancillary jurisdiction over
compulsory counterclaims. 122 Similarly, ancillary jurisdiction has been
universally accepted over cross-claims pursuant to Federal Rule 13(g).123
(2) Ancillary Jurisdiction in the Context of Impleader

Ancillary jurisdiction over Federal Rule 14 impleader claims' 24has
raised difficult questions. Much of this difficulty was due to the Su120. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
121. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1071 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978).
Permissive counterclaims, on the other hand, are those claims not arising from the same
transaction or occurrence as the main claim. FED. R. CIv. P. 13(b). Thus, in order to exercise
jurisdiction over a permissive counterclaim, federal courts must find an independent source of
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Maddox v. Kentucky Fin. Co., 736 F.2d 380, 380 (6th Cir. 1984);
McCaffrey v. Rex Motor Transp., Inc., 672 F.2d 246, 247 (1st Cir. 1982); Whigham v.
Beneficial Fin. Co., 599 F.2d 1322, 1322 (4th Cir. 1979); Pipeliners Local Union No. 798 v.
Ellerd, 503 F.2d 1193, 1198 (10th Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. D'Agostino Excavators,
Inc. v. Heyward-Robinson Co., 430 F.2d 1077, 1080-81 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
1021 (1971). See Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction and the Joinder of Claims in the FederalCourts,
33 F.R.D. 27, 28-29 (1963) [hereinafter Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction and the Joinder of
Claims]. Some courts, however, have developed an exception to this general rule and permit
ancillary jurisdiction over a permissive counterclaim for set-off purposes. E.g., Abromovage
v. United Mine Workers, 726 F.2d 972, 988-89 (3d Cir. 1984). See also Fraser, Ancillary
Jurisdiction and the Joinder of Claims, supra, at 31-34. This exception does not allow
affirmative relief on a permissive counterclaim through ancillary jurisdiction. See 6 FEDERAL
PRACTICE AiD PROCEDURE: Crvm, supra note 59, § 1422, at 175-77.
123. FED. R. Crv. P. 13(g). See, e.g., Danner v. Himmelfarb, 858 F.2d 515, 521 (9th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989); Amco Constr. Co., v. Mississippi State Bldg.
Comm'n, 602 F.2d 730, 731 (5th Cir. 1979); Lasa per L'Industria del Marmo Societa per
Azioni v. Alexander, 414 F.2d 143, 146 (6th Cir. 1969); Atlantic Corp. v. United States, 311
F.2d 907, 910 (1st Cir. 1962); City of Boston v. Boston Edison Co., 260 F.2d 872, 874-75
(1st Cir. 1958).
A cross-claim is any claim asserted by one party in a defensive position against another
coparty "arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the
original action or of a counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject
matter of the original action." FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g). By definition, a plaintiff may assert a
cross-claim against another plaintiff only if the defendant asserts a counterclaim against that
plaintiff. See, e.g., Danner v. Anskis, 256 F.2d 123, 124 (3d Cir. 1958) ("a cross-claim is
intended to state a claim which is ancillary to a claim stated in a complaint or counterclaim
which has previously been filed against the party stating the cross-claim") (emphasis added).
Thus, a plaintiff cannot assert a cross-claim against a coplaintiff arising out of the same
transaction or occurrence as her claim against the defendant.
124. The traditional impleader scenario involves a defendant, as a third-party plaintiff,
who brings a third party defendant into the litigation "who is or may be liable to him for all
or part of the plaintiff's claim against him." FED. R. CIv. P. 14(a).
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preme Court's decision in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger.12s
In Kroger, the plaintiff, an Iowa resident, sued a Nebraska company in federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. The Nebraska company filed a third-party claim, under Federal Rule 14(a),
against Owen Equipment & Erection Company ("Owen"). 126 Ms. Kroger then amended her complaint, adding a claim against Owen, the
third-party defendant. The Nebraska company was granted summary
judgment, leaving only the claim between Ms. Kroger and Owen. 27
During trial the court discovered that Owen's principal place of business was in Iowa and not Nebraska, thus destroying diversity of citizenship as the basis for federal jurisdiction.'2 The Supreme Court
held that, in a diversity case, a federal court does not have ancillary
jurisdiction over a plaintiffs state claim against a nondiverse thirdparty defendant. 29 Because Ms. Kroger could not establish an independent basis for jurisdiction, she was unable to assert her claim against
Owen.
The Kroger Court adopted the Aldinger statutory inquiry to determine whether the court had the power to exercise ancillary jurisdiction. 30 The Court noted that the Gibbs constitutional test, although
satisfied, was not the end of the inquiry; ancillary jurisdiction also had
statutory limitations.' The statutory inquiry, the Kroger Court explained, required an examination of both the congressional intent behind the statute conferring federal jurisdiction12 and the "posture"
33
of the party asserting ancillary jurisdiction.
The Court held that allowing ancillary jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claim against a nondiverse third-party defendant would flout the
34
congressional intent of complete diversity underlying section 1332.1
125. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
126. Id. at 367-77. Ancillary jurisdiction exists over claims brought by the original defendant
against a third-party defendant; the Supreme Court has described this principle as "wellestablished doctrine." Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 714 (1973). Kroger did not
question this exercise of ancillary jurisdiction but distinguished it from the claim before it.
Kroger, 437 U.S. at 375 & n.18. See infra text accompanying notes 144-145; see also Horton
v. Baldwin, 713 F. Supp. 508, 509 (D.D.C. 1989) (allowing the assertion of a third-party claim
in a diversity action).
127. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 365.
128. Id. at 367-69.
129. Id. at 372-77.
130. Id. at 372-76. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
131. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 372-73.
132. Id. at 373-75.
133. Id. at 375-77. Thus, a defending party who is haled into court involuntarily is in a
defensive posture and should be treated more leniently than a plaintiff who is in an offensive
posture because she chose the federal forum. Id. at 376-77. See infra text accompanying notes
142-145.
134. Id. at 374-77.
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A plaintiff, the Court reasoned, could circumvent the requirement of
complete diversity by "the simple expedient of suing only those de-

fendants who were of diverse citizenship and waiting for them to implead nondiverse defendants."' 35 In other words, plaintiffs are barred
from asserting claims against a third-party defendant through the indirect route of Federal Rule 14(a) when they could not assert the claim
directly. The Court acknowledged that Federal Rule 14 allows the assertion of such claims, 13 6 but noted that the federal rules cannot ex31 7
pand federal subject matter jurisdiction.
Commentators have criticized the Kroger Court for denying ancillary jurisdiction over plaintiff's offensive claims against third party
defendants.' 38 As one commentator has argued, "The objection that

the plaintiff is doing indirectly what he cannot do directly is without
merit because he does not bring the third-party defendant into the

action. The plaintiff can assert a claim against the third-party defendant only if the original defendant should bring him into the action. "19 Some have suggested that any abuse of the third-party practice

could be remedied by section 1359 of Title 28, which forbids collusive
attempts to create federal jurisdiction.14° The Supreme Court rejected

this argument in Kroger.'4'
Additionally, the Kroger Court focused on the "posture" of the

party asserting the nonfederal claim to determine if extending ancillary
jurisdiction was improper.

42

In Kroger, the party seeking to invoke

ancillary jurisdiction over the nondiverse third party was in an offensive posture. The Court reasoned that because Ms. Kroger chose
135. Id. at 374.
136. Id. Federal Rule 14(a) provides that a plaintiff may assert any claim against a thirdparty defendant arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff's claim
against the original defendant. FED. R. Crv. P. 14(a).
137. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 371; see FED. R. Crv. P. 82.
138. See, e.g., Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction and the Joinder of Claims, supra note 122 at
42 (1946 amendment to Federal Rule 14 diminishes the possibility of collusion); Garvey, The
Limits of Ancillary Jurisdiction, 57 TEx. L. Rav. 697, 697 (1979) (the line drawn by Kroger
is inconsistent with justifications of fairness, economy and convenience underlying ancillary
jurisdiction); Miller, supra note 8, at 8-9 (arguing the possibility of plaintiff collusion is
remote); see also Kroger, 437 U.S. at 381-83 (White, J., dissenting).
139. Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdictionand the Joinder of Claims, supra note 122, at 42; see
also Garvey, supra note 138, at 703-05 (questioning whether a plaintiff would risk waiting for
defendants to implead parties under Federal Rule 14 in order to assert their claims against
them).
140. See, e.g., Kroger, 437 U.S. at 383 (White, J., dissenting); Note, Rule 14 Claims and
Ancillary Jurisdiction, 57 VA. L. Rav. 265, 274-75 (1971) (authored by T.D.N.).
141. 437 U.S. at 375 n.17 (noting that there is nothing necessarily "collusive" about either
the plaintiff's or the defendant's actions in bringing claims against impleaded third parties).
142. Id. at 375-76.
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to bring her case in federal court, she had to adhere to the limitations
on federal subject matter jurisdiction. 14
In contrast, ancillary jurisdiction "typically involves claims by a
defending party haled into court against his will, or by another person
whose rights might be irretrievably lost unless he could assert them
in an ongoing action in a federal court." 1" Thus, the Court emphasized that fairness to the party in a defensive posture should aid the
court in construing the jurisdictional statute. 45
The Kroger Court's analysis gave rise to additional inquiries in
the context of impleader. Federal Rule 14(a) authorizes many types
of claims other than the traditional third-party claim. For example,
the third-party defendant may implead another party to the action who
may be liable to her for all or part of the third-party plaintiff's claim.'"
The third-party defendant also may assert a claim against the original
plaintiff' 47 or defendant'" that arises out of the same transaction or
occurrence as the main claim. Presumably, ancillary jurisdiction in
these contexts remained unscathed after Kroger, because in all of the
situations above, the parties invoking ancillary jurisdiction are in the
defensive posture.
Two additional exercises of ancillary jurisdiction under Federal
Rule 14 were brought into question after Kroger. First, when a thirdparty defendant invokes ancillary jurisdiction by asserting a transactionally related claim against the original plaintiff, Federal Rule 14(a)
allows the plaintiff to assert a compulsory counterclaim to the thirdparty defendant's claim. 49 At least one district court has extended
ancillary jurisdiction in this context. 150 Second, when a defendant raises
a compulsory counterclaim against the plaintiff, Federal Rule 14(b)
provides that the plaintiffmay implead a third party who may be liable
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 376.
Id.
Id. at 376-77; Note, Toward a Theory of Incidental Jurisdiction, supra note 21, at

1940.
146. FED. R. CIrv. P. 14(a).
147. Id. Federal courts have exercised ancillary jurisdiction over third-party defendants'
claims against the original plaintiff if the third-party's claim arose from the same transaction
or occurrence as the plaintiff's original claim. E.g., Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673
F.2d 951, 960 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982); Revere Copper & Brass,
Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709, 709 (5th Cir. 1970); Union Bank & Trust
Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 38 F.R.D. 486, 489 (D. Neb. 1965); Heintz & Co.
v. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co., 30 F.R.D. 171, 172 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
148. FED. R. Crv. P. 14(a). Federal courts have invoked ancillary jurisdiction when a thirdparty defendant has filed a compulsory counterclaim against the third-party plaintiff (the
original defendant). E.g., Weber v. Weber, 44 F.R.D. 227, 229-31 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
149. FED. R. Clv. P. 14(a).
150. Hyman-Michaels Co. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 496 F. Supp. 663, 666 (N.D. Il. 1980).
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to her for all or part of the defendant's claim."' In this context, at
least two district courts have allowed ancillary jurisdiction. 5 2 These
courts distinguished Kroger, reasoning that the plaintiff had impleaded
the nondiverse third-party as a defense to the defendant's counterclaim
rather than as a strategic attempt to circumvent the diversity require53
ments.
(3) The Unique Ancillary Jurisdiction Problems in the Contexts of
Compulsory Party Joinder and Intervention
Compulsory party joinder under Federal Rule 19 and its relation
to intervention of right under Federal Rule 24(a) have created unique
ancillary jurisdiction problems. Compulsory party joinder involves the
joinder of persons who are necessary for a just and complete adjudication.' 5 4 In contrast to permissive joinder, 55 compulsory joinder
includes those nonparties whose absence threatens to cause judicial
inefficiency and other undesirable consequences. 156 Under Federal Rule
151. FED. R. Crv. P. 14(b).
152. See, e.g., Basic Mach. Co. v. Ketom Constr., Inc., 686 F. Supp. 542, 543-44
(M.D.N.C. 1988); Brown & Caldwell v. Institute for Energy Funding, Ltd., 617 F. Supp. 649,
651 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
153. Brown & Caldwell, 617 F. Supp. at 651. The court further reasoned that the plaintiff
would not logically have included the impleaded third-party as a defendant in the initial action
as the third-party's alleged liability depended on the plaintiff's liability to the defendants on
their counterclaim. Id.
154. The title of FED. R. Crv. P. 19 reads "Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication." For a detailed discussion of Federal Rule 19, see 7 FEDERAL PRATICE AND PROCEDURE:
CiVm, supra note 59, §§ 1601-1626. Additionally, FED. R. Crv. P. 13(h) provides, "Persons
other than those made parties to the original action may be made parties to a counterclaim
or cross-claim in accordance with the provisions of Rules 19 and 20." Thus, the rules governing
ancillary jurisdiction in the context of Rule 19 joinder equally apply to the addition of parties
to counterclaims and cross-claims.
155. Permissive joinder is governed by FED. R. Crv. P. 20. See supra note 72.
156. Under Federal Rule 19(a) a nonparty must be joined where feasible if:
(1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already
parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and
is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a
practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii)
leave any of the persons already parties subject to substantial risk of incurring
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed
interest.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a). Thus, to determine whether an absentee's joinder should be compelledwhether the nonparty is "necessary"-a court must evaluate the strength of the nonparty's
interest in the pending litigation and whether her absence would threaten some aspect of the
litigation. This flexible approach under the Federal Rules requires a careful balancing of
competing interests. See, e.g., Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S.
102, 109-11 (1968).
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57
19(a), the federal court will order such persons joined "if [f]easible."'
If joinder is not feasible, the action must be dismissed if "in equity
and good conscience" the court cannot proceed without those persons.'5 8
Generally, federal courts have denied ancillary jurisdiction and
refused to join nondiverse parties. The issue typically arises when the
addition of the new party would destroy diversity jurisdiction. Under
the Kroger rationale, courts have emphasized the complete diversity
requirement in denying ancillary jurisdiction over necessary parties
joined under Federal Rule 19(a).15 9 In Acton Co. v. Bachman Foods,
Inc.,' 60 for example, Acton's subsidiary brought a diversity action in
federal court seeking a declaratory judgment regarding an agreement
between the defendant and Acton. The subsidiary then sought Acton's
joinder under Federal Rule 19. Although the subsidiary and defendant
were diverse, Acton and the defendant were nondiverse. The First Circuit held that allowing Acton to join as a plaintiff and bring a state
claim against the nondiverse defendant would allow Acton and its subsidiary to circumvent the complete diversity requirement by omitting
Acton from the original complaint and then waiting for Acton to be

joined under Federal Rule

19.161

The Kroger rationale, however, does not explain all cases denying
ancillary jurisdiction over Federal Rule 19 parties. For example, if the
plaintiff has no interest in bringing a claim against a necessary party
defendant, she may file in federal court to avoid litigating a complete
controversy.16 2 As Professor Mengler has noted, "Ancillary jurisdiction, if applied to these circumstances, could ensure complete justice
63
without undermining Kroger's allegiance to complete diversity.'"
When it is infeasible to join a necessary nonparty, the court must
determine whether the nonparty is "indispensable."' 64 In a diversity
157.

FED. R. Crv. P. 19(a). Joinder is "feasible" when the absentee is subject to service

of process and her joinder would not deprive the federal court of subject matter jurisdiction.
Id.

158.

FED. R. CIrv. P. 19(b). Such persons are labeled indispensable parties. Id.

159. E.g., Acton Co. v. Bachman Foods, Inc., 668 F.2d 76, 79-80 (Ist Cir. 1982); Travelers
Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 691 F. Supp. 503, 507 (D. Me. 1988); H & H Int'l Corp. v. J.
Pellechia Trucking, Inc., 119 F.R.D. 352, 354-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); see also Provident Trades-

mens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1968) (although before Kroger,
the Court likewise held that when the nondiverse absentee would destroy diversity jurisdiction,

she cannot be joined).
160.

668 F.2d 76 (Ist Cir. 1982).

161.

Id. at 79-80; see Mengler, supra note 8, at 284.

162.
Moines
163.
164.

Mengler, supra note 8, at 284 (citing Helzberg's Diamond Shops v. Valley West Des
Shopping Center, 564 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1977)).
Id.
FED. R. Crv. P. 19(b). Federal Rule 19(b) provides four factors for the court to
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action, if a court determines that a nondiverse absentee is not an indispensable party, the absentee may not be joined, and the suit will
proceed in her absence. 165 If a court classifies an absentee as "indispensable," however, the case must be dismissed. Courts consistently
have held that a nondiverse indispensable party cannot be joined and
have denied ancillary jurisdiction in diversity actions.1 67
In contrast to the compulsory joinder context, in which an original party to an action seeks a nonparty's presence, intervention under
Federal Rule 24 permits a nonparty to seek her own joinder. 16 Federal
Rule 24 divides intervention into two categories: intervention of right
and permissive intervention. Generally, intervention is "of right" when
the applicant claims an interest in the subject matter and her absence
would impair or impede her ability to protect her interests.1 69 In contrast, intervention is "permissive" when "an applicant's claim or de1 70
fense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common."
Under Federal Rule 24 an extra-jurisdictional question arises similar to that found in the compulsory joinder context: Can a federal
court exercise ancillary jurisdiction over an intervenor, whose presence
would defeat federal jurisdiction if joined? As in the compulsory joinder context, this problem usually arises in diversity cases when the
intervenor is nondiverse as to an adverse party.' 7 '
Generally, federal courts have ancillary jurisdiction over an intervenor of right. 72 Ancillary jurisdiction in this context may be jusconsider:
[F]irst, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be
prejudicial to the person or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by
protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures,
the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the
person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate
remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
FED. R. Crv. P. 19(b).
165. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b).
166. See id.
167. E.g., Chance v. County Bd. of School Trustees, 332 F.2d 971, 973 (7th Cir. 1964);
Spiller v. Tennessee Trailers, Inc., 97 F.R.D. 347, 348 (N.D. Ga. 1982); see 7 FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIviL, supra note 59, § 1610, at 149; Note, Developments in the
Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L. REV. 874, 993-94 (1958).
168. FED. R. CIv. P. 24. Federal Rule 24 is discussed at length in 7C FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: CIViL, supra note 58, §§ 1901-1923.
169. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
170. FED. R. CIrv. P. 24(b).
171. There have been some cases, however, in which the person seeking to intervene as a
plaintiff in a federal question case asserts a nonfederal claim. E.g., Toles v. United States,
371 F.2d 784, 785 (10th Cir. 1967).
172. E.g., Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236, 240-46 (1886); Curtis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
754 F.2d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1985); American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bailey, 750 F.2d 577,
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tified on two grounds. Typically the interest of the intervenor of right

could be impaired by her absence because it is not adequately represented by the existing parties. 173 Thus, by allowing intervention the
court serves judicial economy by having the entire controversy resolved
in one lawsuit rather than several. Also intervention of right promotes
fairness for the otherwise absent party:
To require the absentee to stand by and watch others who do not
adequately represent him litigate a matter that may result in a disposition that will harm his interest is unfair. This unfairness ought
not and need not result from the accident that he is of the wrong
citizenship to have independent jurisdictional grounds and the happenstance that the original parties chose a federal court rather than
a state court as the forum for their dispute. 174

The Supreme Court in Kroger acknowledged the validity of ancillary jurisdiction over intervenors of right. 175 In this context, a party
who intervenes as of right, whether as a third-party plaintiff or as a
third-party defendant, is in a defensive posture-she had no "choice"
of forum and thus had to intervene.

76

Many lower federal courts,

however, have held that ancillary jurisdiction is improper if the party
seeking to intervene as a matter of right could be classified as an indispensable party under Federal Rule 19.177 If the intervenor was in582 (7th Cir. 1984); Smith Petroleum Serv., Inc. v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 420 F.2d 1103,
1113-15 (5th Cir. 1970); Formulabs, Inc. v. Hatley Pen Co., 318 F.2d 485, 491-92 (9th Cir.
1963). See generally 7C FEDERAL. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CrvI, supra note 59, §§ 190609, 1917 (discussing ancillary jurisdiction in the context of intervention).
In contrast, the federal courts have not exercised ancillary jurisdiction in cases of "permissive
intervention" under Rule 24(b). E.g., Hougen v. Merkel, 47 F.R.D. 528, 528 (D. Minn. 1969);
see also Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction of Federal Courts of Persons Whose Interest May Be
Impaired If Not Joined, 62 F.R.D. 483, 483 (1974) [hereinafter Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction
of Federal Courts] (stating that the same test applies to determine when a person can intervene
of right and when ancillary jurisdiction exists). It should be noted that the "common questions
of law or fact" requirement of Federal Rule 24(b) may mean that the intervenor's claim arises
out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claims between the existing parties. See J.
FRiEDENTEAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIvIL PROCEDURE § 2.14, at 78 (1985); Mengler, supra
note 8, at 282-83. Nevertheless, federal courts have refused ancillary jurisdiction in this context
on the basis that it would "conceivably obliterate the complete diversity requirement." Mengler,
supra note 8, at 283.
173. 7C FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CVL, supra note 59, § 1917, at 477.
174. Id.; see also Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 617 n.14 (1966)
(noting that the "same considerations of judicial economy and fairness to all the parties lie
behind the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction ... and the doctrine that an intervenor of right
may assert a cross-claim without independent jurisdictional grounds") (citations omitted).
175. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 375-76 & n.18 (1978).
176. See id. at 375-76 & n.18; see also Usery v. Brandel, 87 F.R.D., 670, 680 (W.D. Mich.
1980) (noting that applicants for intervention did not choose the forum and thus cannot
circumvent jurisdictional requirements). However, the Krogerrationale could be read to prohibit
the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over an intervening third-party plaintiff. Arguably an
intervening third-party plaintiff is in an offensive position as well as voluntarily in the action.
177. E.g., Traveler's Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 691 F. Supp. 503, 504 (D. Me. 1988);
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dispensable but her presence would have destroyed diversity
jurisdiction, these courts have held that the intervention must be denied, and the entire action dismissed. 78 If, however, the intervenor
of right was only a party who should be joined if feasible under Federal Rule 19, then9 ancillary jurisdiction could be invoked and inter7
vention granted.
This situation has created an anomaly. 80 Under Federal Rule 19,
if a nonparty is necessary but not indispensable, and her presence would
destroy the court's diversity jurisdiction, joinder is denied and the suit

proceeds in her absence.' 8' She could seek successfully, however, to
intervene under the federal court's ancillary jurisdiction. 182 On the other
hand, if the same person seeks to intervene but her interest in the action is so significant that the court could not proceed without her,
then, paradoxically, the court must deny her application to enter the
action, and dismiss the entire case. 83
Two justifications support the existence of this anomaly. First,
when an absentee is deemed "indispensable" under Rule 19, the claim
is no longer "ancillary," but an essential part of the suit.' 84 Thus,
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Blindauers Sheet Metal & Heating Co., 61 F.R.D. 323, 323 (E.D.
Wis. 1973); see also Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdictionof Federal Courts, supra note 172, at 484.
178. E.g., Traveler's Indem. Co., 691 F. Supp. at 504; Insurance Co. of N. Am., 61
F.R.D. at 323.
179. E.g., Drillers Engine & Supply, Inc. v. Burckhater, 327 F. Supp. 648, 648 (W.D.
Okl. 1971); see also Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, supra note 172, at 484.
180. See 7 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIrV, supra note 59, § 1610, at 149-54;
7C FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL, supra note 59, § 1917, at 477-81; see also
Kennedy, Let's All Join In: Intervention Under Federal Rule 24, 57 Ky. L.J. 329, 362-63
(1969) (observing that "the jurisdictional result turns on whether the entry is initiated by one
of the original parties under Rule 19, or by the absent party under Rule 24" and that "[t]his
distinction seems difficult to rationalize").
181. FED. R. Ciy. P. 19(a).
182. See, e.g., Drumright v. Texas Sugarland Co., 16 F.2d 657, 658 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
274 U.S. 749 (1927). There the Fifth Circuit held that a party could not be joined because he
was not indispensable but could intervene as a matter of right. Id. at 658. The vendor of land
and the mortgagor joined in an action against the vendee who had failed to pay the full
purchase price. The mortgagor was a citizen of the same state as the defendant and thus was
dismissed as a party. The mortgagor was allowed to intervene and assert the same claim he
had not been allowed to assert as an original plaintiff because he was a nondiverse party. Id.
at 658. See also Glen Falls Ins. Co. v. Cook Bros., 23 F.R.D. 269, 272-73 (S.D. Ind. 1959)
(noting that "there is a marked difference in the approach followed in a case where voluntary
joinder under Rule 24 is sought and a case in which involuntary joinder is sought pursuant
to Rule 19").
183. See supra notes 177-178 and accompanying text.
184. See Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48, 54 (1922). In
deciding whether to allow the intervention of a nondiverse party defendant, Chief Justice Taft
stated that jurisdiction is not "defeated by the intervention, by leave of the court, of a party
whose presence is not essential to a decision of the controversy between the original parties."
Id. (emphasis added).
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exercising ancillary jurisdiction would be improper. Second, allowing
ancillary jurisdiction in this context constitutes a total circumvention
of the complete diversity requirement.' 5
Courts and commentators sharply criticize this anomaly, suggesting various approaches to avoid it. One group of commentators
has argued that ancillary jurisdiction should extend to indispensable
parties, and that the federal court should deny intervention if it finds
collusion among the parties to circumvent the federal jurisdiction requirements.' 8 6 Another commentator has contended:
Instead of depending on who initiates the joinder proceeding, jurisdiction should depend on the absentee's relationship to the action
and the interest that would be protected by his joinder. Thus, where
an absentee has an interest in the subject of an action that may be
impaired in his absence, ancillary jurisdiction should exist whether
the absentee
seeks to intervene or whether he is brought into the ac8 7
tion.

Similarly, some lower federal courts have reasoned that the only difference between intervention of right and joinder is who initiates the
addition of the new party.'88 Thus, the key factor in determining when
to exercise ancillary jurisdiction should not be whether the absentee
intervenes or joins but whether she is a necessary or indispensable
party.'8 9 In contrast, rather than using labels of "indispensable" or

"necessary," the Supreme Court, over a century ago, emphasized the
need to protect an intervening party's interest.'19 Regardless of this
criticism, however, the anomaly persists.
D.

The Beginning of Doctrinal Unification

After Aldinger v. Howard,'9' the question remained as to whether
the statutory inquiry required for pendent-party jurisdiction also ap185.

See Chance v. County Bd. of School Trustees, 332 F.2d 971, 974 (7th Cir. 1964); see

also supra notes 134-137 and accompanying text. But see 7 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
Civn, supra note 59, § 1610, at 150-151 (arguing that the circumvention of complete diversity
does not constitute a serious threat).
186. See 7 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Crv, supra note 59, § 1610 at 151.
187. Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, supra note 172, at 487; see also
Kennedy, supra note 180, at 363.

188. See, e.g., New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 438 F. Supp. 440,
445 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
189.

Id.

190.

Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236, 239 (1886) (allowing persons to intervene as defendants

to protect their property interests even though they were nondiverse as to the plaintiff). The

Supreme Court noted that "if the Zeidlers were permitted to [intervene and] defend, it was
for their own interest, and not because they were either necessary or indispensable parties to
the proceeding in which plaintiffs were the actors." Id.

191.

427 U.S. 1 (1976).
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plied to pendent-claim and ancillary jurisdiction. 92 In Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 93 the Supreme Court answered this
question in the affirmative.
In Kroger, the Court brought pendent and ancillary jurisdiction
under one analytical framework. Although the Court again found it
unnecessary to determine whether any principled differences existed
between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction,194 the Court admitted that
the concepts addressed the same issue: When may a federal district
court hear and decide a nonfederal claim? 95 The Court began by asserting that the analysis under United Mine Workers v. Gibbs'96 "delineate[s] the constitutional limits of federal judicial power.'' 97 The
Court further announced that the Aldinger statutory inquiry applied
to all exercises of pendent-claim and ancillary jurisdiction, as well as
pendent-party jurisdiction:
Even if it be assumed that the District Court in the present case had
constitutional power to decide the respondent's lawsuit against the
petitioner, it does not follow that the decision of the Court of Appeals [to exercise ancillary jurisdiction] was correct. Constitutional
power is merely the first hurdle that nust be overcome in determining
that a federal court has jurisdiction over a particular controversy.
For the jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited not only by the
provisions of Art. III of the Constitution, but also by Acts of Congress.198

Although the Kroger holding must be read in light of its procedural context-the federal courts' power to exercise ancillary jurisdiction over additional parties-sul~sequent cases have interpreted
Kroger as applying the Aldinger statutory inquiry to both ancillary'"
and pendent 2®' jurisdiction over additional nonfederal claims between
the original parties. Thus, in all cases in which a federal court could
exercise extra-jurisdictional power, the court had to determine first,
192.
193.
194.
195.

See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
437 U.S. 365 (1978).
Id. at 370 n.8.
Id. at 370.

196. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
197. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 371. The Court, however, qualified this broad statement, noting,
"The Court of Appeals ... believed that the 'common nucleus of operative fact' test ...

determines the outer boundaries of constitutionally permissible federal jurisdiction when that
jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship. We may assume without deciding that the
Court of Appeals was correct in this regard." Id. at 371 n.10.
198. Id. at 371-72 (footnote omitted).
199. See, e.g., Finkle v. Gulf & Western Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1015, 1018-19 (3d Cir. 1984);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 675 F.2d 633, 638-40 (5th Cir. 1982).
200. See, e.g., Jones v. Intermountain Power Project, 794 F.2d 546, 552 (10th Cir. 1986);
Thompkins v. Stuttgart School Dist. No. 22, 787 F.2d 439, 441-42 (8th Cir. 1986); United
States ex rel. Hoover v. Franzen, 669 F.2d 433, 438-41 (7th Cir. 1982).
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whether the exercise of jurisdiction was constitutional, and second,
whether or not Congress had rejected the exercise of jurisdiction in
the relevant jurisdictional statute.
The Court's unified analysis focused on the original federal claim
to determine whether the courts had the power to exercise jurisdiction,
rather than examining whether the nonfederal claim was pendent or
ancillary. 201 Generally, the issue before the Kroger Court was whether
a plaintiff could assert a nonfederal claim against a nondiverse third
party who otherwise was not otherwise subject to federal jurisdiction.m In answering this question, the Court distinguished between
jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship and jurisdiction based on
a federal question. 23 By applying the Aldinger statutory limitation to
diversity cases, the Kroger Court explicitly prohibited a plaintiff from
asserting a nonfederal claim against a nondiverse third party.2 The
Court left open this possibility, however, in the context of federal
question jurisdiction.
Arguably, a federal court could exercise pendent or ancillary jurisdiction over a plaintiff's nonfederal claim against a nondiverse party
in federal question cases without undermining the Kroger Court's rationale. 250 With the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction,
litigants may pursue "their federal claims in federal court without being compelled by law in the case of exclusive federal questions, or by
practicality in the case of concurrent federal questions to send off the
rest of their litigation package to state court or to abandon entirely
the state portion of the package." ' In cases falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of federal and state courts, a plaintiff could bring
the entire action in state court and thus effectuate judicial efficiency.
201.

See Note, Toward a Theory of Incidental Jurisdiction, supra note 21, in which the

author relies on the Kroger decision to propose a uniform theory of "incidental jurisdiction."
In determining whether a court may exercise "incidental jurisdiction," the author does not
use the labels of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, but rather argues that courts should only

consider whether the basis for the federal claim is diversity or a federal question. Id. at 194143, 1946-53.
202. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 367. The Court was faced with the same issue in Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1976), but refused to answer the question in broad terms. See supra
notes 89-91 and accompanying text.

203. It should be noted that the issue of pendent-claim jurisdiction does not arise in the
context of diversity cases, since a plaintiff may always aggregate claims against the same
diverse defendant as long as at least one claim satisfies the jurisdictional amount in controversy
requirement. See, e.g., Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196, 1198 n.2 (9th Cir.), cert.
granted, 434 U.S. 814 (1977), cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978).
204. See 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION, supra note 8, § 3523, at
101; Note, Toward a Theory of Incidental Jurisdiction, supra note 21, at 1940.
205. See Note, Toward a Theory of Incidental Jurisdiction,supra note 21, at 1941-43.
206. Mengler, supra note 8, at 280.
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In passing the federal statutes, however, Congress intended to ensure
the availability of federal forums for the vindication of federally created rights .2 07 Requiring plaintiffs to bring their federal question claims
in state court would frustrate this congressional intent. Furthermore,
there is no guarantee that a plaintiff will choose to bring her entire
action in a state court. Instead, she may split her claims between state
and federal court and litigate the same set of facts in two forums. This
litigation strategy wastes judicial time and energy. Federal courts have
a duty to promote judicial economy of the total court system and prevent crowded dockets not only in federal courts, but also in state
courts. 2° s As one commentator noted, "If federal courts refuse to use
conceptual tools to dispose of all related claims with the greatest economy and convenience, the federal courts then add to the total ineconomy and inconvenience which litigants must suffer to obtain justice
9
on the merits of their claims.' '20
In cases arising under exclusive federal jurisdiction, the court's
denial of pendent or ancillary jurisdiction over a plaintiff's nonfederal
claim would not only contribute to the system's inefficiency, it also
would be unfair. Because a federal court is the only forum in which
all the claims may be tried together, the plaintiff would not have the
option of taking the main claim to state court. 210 In such a case, the
plaintiff does not have a real choice of forum. Thus, both plaintiff
and defendant may be viewed as in a defensive posture-neither party
having a real choice of forum. 21 1 Under the Kroger analysis, therefore,
"plaintiff-defendant labels do not conclusively determine posture.1 212
In this way, Kroger's rationale could be read consistently with the
exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction in cases based on exclusive fed214
eral jurisdiction. 213 The Aldinger Court had left this possiblity open.

Arguably, this situation presents the strongest case for retaining a related nonfederal claim against a nondiverse third party.
Even though the Supreme Court's Aldinger and Kroger decisions
unified the analysis of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, most lower
federal courts adhered to the pendent-ancillary distinction. 2 5- Many
207. See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
208. See Comment, Toward a Synthesis of Two Doctrines, supra note 42, at 1268 n.29
(quoting 3 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, para. 14.27, at 14-572 (2d ed. 1948)).
209. Id.
210. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976).
211. See Note, Toward a Theory of Incidental Jurisdiction, supra note 21, at 1945.
212. Id. at 1944.
213. See supra notes 142-145 and accompanying text.
214. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18; see supra note 88 and accompanying text.
215. Note, Developing a Unified Approach, supra note 5, at 532.
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courts and commentators comparing pendent and ancillary jurisdiction
concluded that they are distinguishable. The distinctions made, however, vary. The Fifth Circuit, for example, has held that nonfederal
claims were not within the federal court's ancillary jurisdiction because
they were not "logically dependent" on the main claim, even though
they arose from a "common nucleus of operative fact. ' 21 6 Such an
analysis places greater limitations on~the federal courts' ancillary powers than its pendent powers. On the other hand, Professor Miller has
argued that imposing the Gibbs common nucleus test on ancillary jurisdiction would create "practical difficulties of administration" because not all claims arising from the same transaction or occurrence
arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact. 217 Professor Miller
views ancillary jurisdiction as broader than pendent jurisdiction.
Some courts and commentators have treated the "same transaction or occurrence" test and the "common nucleus of operative
facts" test as interchangeable. 218 Although arguably the most appropriate interpretation of the two standards, 2 9 this view has not gained
widespread acceptance. Thus, the federal courts have persisted in their
inconsistent and haphazard application of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.
H.

The Extinction of Supplemental Jurisdiction

Although pendent and ancillary jurisdiction have been marked
with confusion and inconsistency, the federal circuits generally have
accepted these doctrines as. necessary for the efficient and just adjudication of claims in federal court. "0 In Finley v. United States,"1
216. Travelers Ins. Co. v. First Nat'I Bank, 675 F.2d 633, 638-40 (5th Cir. 1982) (interpreting
Kroger as demanding logical dependence between the federal and nonfederal claims in addition

to the same "core of operative facts"); see also Note, Toward a Theory of Incidental
Jurisdiction, supra note 21, at 1950-51 (discussing generally, "common nucleus of operative

facts" and logical dependence test); supra notes 114-118 and accompanying text.
217.

Miller, supra note 8, at 6-7. See also Wilder v. Irvin, 423 F. Supp. 639, 643 (N.D.,

Ga. 1976) (admitting that the claims arose from the same transaction or occurrence but
declining to hear the pendent claim because of insufficient evidentiary overlap between the
state and federal claim); see also Jacobs v. United States, 367 F. Supp. 1275, 1277 (D. Ariz.

1973) (characterizing pendent jurisdiction as a subset of ancillary jurisdiction).
218. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Crazy Eddie, Inc. 702 F. Supp. 962, 983 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (a
federal court must determine whether the federal and nonfederal claims arose from a "common
nucleus of operative fact" before conferring ancillary jurisdiction); Matasar, Rediscovering
"One Constitutional Case," supra note 17, at 1453-54; Mengler, supra note 8, at 274 n.132;

see also supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (cases adopting a "transactional" interpretation of the Gibbs standard).
219. See infra notes 289-291.

220. See Mengler, supra note 8, at 247-48; see also supra notes 6-9, 32-37, 205-214 and
accompanying text.
221.

490 U.S. 545 (1989).
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however, the Supreme Court abruptly extinguished the era of pendent
222
and ancillary jurisdiction.

A.

The Finley Holding

In Finley, the plaintiff's husband and children were killed when
their airplane struck electrical wires during its approach to a San Diego
airport. Ms. Finley sued the utility company in state court, and later
brought an action against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) 223 for the negligence of the Federal Aviation Administration. Because FTCA actions arise under exclusive federal jurisdiction, Ms. Finley brought the action against the United States in
federal court. She later sought to append the state claim against the
utility company.2 24 The issue confronting the Court was whether a federal court could extend jurisdiction over a nonfederal claim against
a nondiverse third party, simply because the court had exclusive jurisdiction over a federal claim arising from the same set of facts.22
In light of the Aldinger-Kroger precedents, Finley presented a
strong case for the extension of pendent-party jurisdiction. The original claim was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Not only had Aldinger specifically mentioned exclusive jurisdiction as
a category of cases when pendent-party jurisdiction might be appropriate, 2 6 but jurisdiction also seemed consistent with the Kroger Court's
rationale. 227 Moreover, in contrast to the diversity jurisdiction statute,
the FTCA did not appear to have policies inconsistent with the exercise
of pendent-party jurisdiction. 2 8 Nevertheless, Justice Scalia, writing
for the majority in Finley, dismissed these arguments. 29
The Finley Court applied the Gibbs-Aldinger-Kroger analytical
framework. 2 0 The Court first assumed that Gibbs delineated the
broadest constitutional authority to exercise pendent-party jurisdiction
and that Ms. Finley's nonfederal claims met the minimum constitu222. See Mengler, supra note 8, at 247; Perdue, supra note 12, at 539-41; Comment,
Pendent Party Jurisdiction After Finley v. United States: A Trend Toward Its Abolition, 24
GA. L. REv. 447, 465 (1990) (authored by Susan Irby Lasseter) [hereinafter Comment, Pendent
Party JurisdictionAfter Finley].
223. The Federal Tort Claims Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. 1346(b) (1988).
224. Finley, 490 U.S. at 546.
225. Id. at 547.
226. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976). See supra note 90 and accompanying
text.
227. See supra notes 210-213 and accompanying text.
228. See Perdue, supra note 12, at 551-52.
229. Finley, 490 U.S. at 555-56.
230. Id. at 548-52.
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tional criterion. 231 Next, the Court examined whether Congress had
addressed the exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction in this context. 212
Under Aldinger a federal court was empowered to exercise pendentparty jurisdiction unless Congress had acted to deny it.233 The Finley

Court, however, rejected this approach. Instead, the Court announced
that federal courts had to find an express congressional authorization
to exercise jurisdiction over nonfederal claims.2 4 As a result of the

new stringent requirement of express congressional approval, the Court
held that the FTCA provision conferring jurisdiction over civil actions
against the United States did not authorize jurisdiction over claims
against pendent parties for which there was no independent source of
235
jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the Finley Court explicitly closed the opening left
by Aldinger. In Finley, the Court held that exclusive federal jurisdiction over the original claim was insufficient to justify the exercise
of pendent-party jurisdiction?26 It acknowledged the negative impact

of the decision, but claimed it had no choice:
Because the FTCA permits the Government to be sued only in federal
court, our holding that parties to related claims cannot necessarily
be sued there means that the efficiency and convenience of a con231. Id. at 548-49.
232. As in Kroger, the Court affirmed that federal courts do not automatically possess the
authority to hear all actions covered by the Constitution. The provisions of Article III specify
the outer limits of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Within those limits the federal courts
are authorized to hear only those cases that Congress authorizes them to hear. Finley, 490
U.S. at 548. See supra text accompanying notes 131-133 and 198.
233. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
234. Finley, 490 U.S. at 549-51. See Mengler, supra note 8, at 255-56; Perdue, supra note
12, at 555 ("the Court chose not to dignify the ['negation'] test with so much as a decent
burial"). The Court based its decision on the well accepted principle that both constitutional
and congressional authorization are necessary to create federal subject matter jurisdiction.
Finley, 490 U.S. at 548 (citing Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252 (1867)); see also
supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. The Court extended this idea to require express
congressional authorization before a federal court may exercise pendent-party jurisdiction.
Justice Blackmun in his dissent argued that the majority considered the wrong question
under Aldinger, and that the proper inquiry was whether "Congress has demonstrated an
intent to exempt 'the party as to whom jurisdiction pendent to the principal claim' is asserted
from being haled into federal court." Finley, 490 U.S. at 556 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(quoting Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 16) (emphasis in original); see also id. at 573-75 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the majority opinion is inconsistent with Aldinger).
235. Finley, 490 U.S. at 551-52 (holding the phrase .'against the United States' means
against the United States and no one else"); see also Menger, supra note 8, at 257-58.
236. Finley, 490 U.S. at 551-52. However, Justice Blackmun in his dissent argued that
Aldinger should not be interpreted as an obstacle to the exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction
since Aldinger's dicta stated that pendent-party jurisdiction might be proper in this precise
circumstance. Id. at 557-58 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). According to Justice Blackmun, the
sensible result in a case with an exclusive federal claim is to extend jurisdiction over the
pendent-party. Id.; see also id. at 569-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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solidated action will sometimes have to be foregone in favor of sep-

arate actions in state and federal courts. We acknowledged this
now conpotential consideration in Aldinger, 427 U.S., at 18, but
23 7
clude that the present statute permits no other result.
Thus, Ms. Finley had to bring her state claim in state court, which
forced her to bring separate lawsuits against each defendant.
B.

The Far-Reaching Implications of Finley

If Finley's only consequence was to extinguish the federal courts'
power to exercise pendent-party jurisdiction under the FTCA, its holding would justify less discussion. The implications of the decision,
however, were far-reaching. One commentator described the consequences as follows: "In Finley, the Supreme Court turned [the GibbsAldinger-Kroger] analytical framework on its head and in the process
took the breath away from all forms of supplemental jurisdiction." 238
(1) The Abolition of Pendent-PartyJurisdiction
Although the Court's holding only explicitly abolished pendentparty jurisdiction under the FTCA, Justice Scalia's opinion was written broadly enough to threaten the entire doctrine's viability. 239 All
instances of pendent-party jurisdiction involve a party over whom
Congress has not explicitly authorized federal jurisdiction, otherwise,
24
the doctrine of pendent-party jurisdiction would be unnecessary. 0
Thus, Finley has caused much confusion in this area. 241 In fact, many
237. Id. at 555-56.
238. Mengler, supra note 8, at 255.
239. See id. at 258; Perdue, supra note 12, at 540; Comment, Pendent Party Jurisdiction
After Finley, supra note 222, at 470.
240. Justice Blackmun, in his dissenting opinion, recognized this consequence of Finley:
[T]he Aldinger test would be rendered meaningless if the required intent could be
found in the failure of the relevant jurisdiction statute to mention the type of party
in question, "because all instances of asserted pendent-party jurisdiction will by
definition involve a party as to whom Congress has impliedly 'addressed itself' by
not expressly conferring subject-matter jurisdiction on the federal courts."
Finley, 490 U.S. at 556-57 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S.
1, 23 (1976) (Brennan, J.,dissenting)).
241. See Perdue, supra note 12, at 570-72. Some lower federal courts admit that Finley
does affect the future of pendent-party jurisdiction, but believe that the Court did not intend
to abolish this useful doctrine. Thus, they struggle to limit Finley to its facts. See, e.g., Roco
Carriers, Ltd. v. M/V Nurnberg Express, 899 F.2d 1292, 1295-97 (2d Cir. 1990) (distinguishing
Finley and the jurisdictional statute for FTCA claims from the admiralty jurisdiction statute,
and holding that "pendent-party jurisdiction is [still] available in the unique area of admiralty");
Bruce v. Martin, 724 F. Supp. 124, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting that the Finley approach may
be intended to apply only to statutes, such as the FTCA, which specifically refer to claims
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lower federal courts have read the decision as precluding the federal
courts' exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction altogether. 247
(2) The Abolition of Ancillary Jurisdiction Over Additional Parties
After Finley, any exercise of pendent or ancillary jurisdiction over
claims by or against additional parties appeared to be doomed. 243 Finley undermined the exercise of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction in
the context of impleader, compulsory and permissive joinder, com-

pulsory counterclaims and cross-claims against additional parties, and
claims raised by intervenors of right: "Our cases show.., that with
respect to the addition of parties, as opposed to the addition of only
claims, we will not assume that the full constitutional power has been

congressionally authorized, and will not read jurisdiction statutes
broadly." 2" In the final substantive paragraph of the majority opinagainst "particular parties"). Other courts, however, have continued to analyze pendent-party
jurisdiction as if Finley changed nothing. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Comas, 888 F.2d 899, 90506 (Ist Cir. 1989), amending 875 F.2d 979 (1st Cir. 1989) (allowing joinder of a pendent-party
plaintiff in a § 1983 action). Rodriguez was initially decided a few days after Finley without
citation to that case. The court later amended its opinion to include a discussion of Finley,
but reaffirmed its conclusion that pendent-party jurisdiction was properly extended. Id. See
also Armstrong v. Edelson, 718 F. Supp. 1372, 1376 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (citing Finley for the
proposition that a federal court's determination to exercise pendent-party jurisdiction requires
that the court decide whether "Congress has limited or negated pendent jurisdiction" in the
relevant statute-the Aldinger statutory inquiry); 640 Broadway Renaissance Co. v. Cuomo,
714 F. Supp. 686, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (also citing Finley for support of the Aldinger statutory
inquiry).
The Ninth Circuit has upheld pendent-party jurisdiction in a case removed under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1988). Teledyne, Inc. v. Kone Corp.,
892 F.2d 1404, 1408-09 (9th Cir. 1989). The Ninth Circuit held that the relevant statutory
language was distinguishable from that in Finley and authorized pendent-party jurisdiction.
Unlike the FTCA, the FSIA allows the removal of "any civil action" against a foreign state.
The Ninth Circuit noted that this phrase "tends to affirmatively exclude the sort of unspoken
qualification read into the statute in Finley." 892 F.2d at 1409. See also Nolan v. Boeing, 919
F.2d 1058, 1064 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that the phrase "any civil action" allows removal of
the entire FSIA suit). The Ninth Circuit's opinion is especially noteworthy because prior to
Finley, the Ninth Circuit was the only court to reject pendent-party jurisdiction categorically.
See Carpenters S. Calif. Admin. Corp. v. D & L Camp Constr. Co., 738 F.2d 999, 1000 (9th
Cir. 1984); see also Perdue, supra note 12, at 570-71 & n.179.
242. E.g., Iron Workers Mid-South Pension Fund v. Terotechnology, 891 F.2d 548, 551
(5th Cir. 1990) (describing Finley as holding that pendent-party jurisdiction, while constitutional,
has not been congressionally authorized); Staffer v. Bouchard Trans. Co., 878 F.2d 638, 643
n.5 (2d Cir. 1989) (observing that "pendent-party jurisdiction apparently is no longer a viable
concept" after Finley); Mechanical Rubber & Supply Co. v. American Saw & Mfg. Co., 747
F. Supp. 1292, 1298 (C.D. II. 1990) (noting that, "[t]here may be statutes that affirmatively
grant pendent-party jurisdiction, but they surely must be exceptional. It is not surprising that
lower courts are reading Finley as putting an end to that jurisdiction." (citations omitted)).
243. See Finley, 490 U.S. at 574-75 & n.30 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Mengler, supra note
8, at 258-59; Perdue, supra note 12, at 557-66.
244. Finley, 490 U.S. at 549 (emphasis added).
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have held that

a grant of jurisdiction over claims involving particular parties does not
itself confer jurisdiction over additional claims by or against different
parties. "245
The Court's broad language foreclosed the extra-jurisdictional
possibilities left open after Aldinger and Kroger.246 It implicitly rejected the view expressed in Kroger that the posture of the party at247
tempting the joinder of an additional party might be determinative.
Although out of fairness a court may extend ancillary jurisdiction to
parties that a defendant seeks to join, the Finley Court concluded that
"neither the convenience of the litigants nor consideration of judicial

economy can suffice to justify extension of the doctrine of ancillary
jurisdiction. ' ' 248 Indeed, at least one district court acknowledged that
Finley threatened ancillary jurisdiction over the impleader of a nondiverse third-party defendant. 249
(3) Does Finley Undermine Gibbs and the Exercise of Pendent-Claim
and Ancillary-Claim Jurisdiction?
Although the language in Finley indicates that the Court wished to
leave the Gibbs-line of cases untouched, this desire was contradicted
by the Court's rationale. Justice Scalia noted that "our cases do not
display an entirely consistent approach with respect to the necessity
that jurisdiction be explicitly conferred. The Gibbs line of cases was
a departure from prior practice, and a departurethat we have no intent
to limit or impair."250 To make a distinction between the exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction over an additional party and supplemental
245. Id. at 556 (emphasis added).
246. Id.; see supra notes 90, 142-153, 205-214 and accompanying text.
247. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1978). In Kroger, the
Court clearly left open the possibility that the defendant, rather than the plaintiff, might join
an additional party based on ancillary jurisdiction. Id.
248. Finley, 490 U.S. at 522 (quoting Kroger, 437 U.S. at 376-77).
249. Community Coffee Co. v. M/S Kriti Amethyst, 715 F. Supp. 772, 773-74 (E.D. La.
1989). This court seemed reluctant to reach such a conclusion because of the "compelling
policy considerations" in support of ancillary jurisdiction. After analyzing Finley, however,
the court concluded:
[T]he ancillary jurisdictional basis for the third party claims ... may have been
caught in the wide swath Finley cut into supplemental jurisdiction. While the Finley
majority may well have intended to address specifically the pendent party jurisdiction
problem, the opinion's sweeping language is undeniable. Thus, its effect on supplemental jurisdiction in general is potentially far-reaching.
Id. at 774 (footnotes omitted); see also Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Spartan Mechanical
Corp., 738 F. Supp. 664, 673-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (reviewing conflicting district court decisions).
250. Finley, 490 U.S. at 556 (emphasis added).
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jurisdiction over an existing party, however, makes little sense under
the Court's analysis.25 Both doctrines involve the adjudication of a

nonfederal claim that is beyond the limits of federal subject-matter
jurisdiction. As one commentator has argued, "because they exceed
our state-federal balance in the same measure, both should rise or fall
2

together."
Both courts and commentators have advocated this view. Even prior

to Finley, many commentators contended that jurisdiction over pendent parties is neither more or less troubling than other recognized

forms of supplemental jurisdiction.213 Recently, Judge Posner, writing
for a unanimous Seventh Circuit, noted that the court was
well aware that [the Finley] decision is premised on a hostility to
nonstatutory jurisdiction that may eventually sweep into history's
dustbin not only whatever pendent party jurisdiction survives the
holding of Finley but also pendent claim jurisdiction and ancillary
jurisdiction. And we share the concern that underlies Finley with
judges' creating their own jurisdiction.2 4
Thus, as one commentator has stated, "the Finley Court declared Gibbs

brain dead, but refused to discontinue life support. One can only won' 5
der how long this can continue.
C. The Practical Consequences of Finley
The consequences of the complete extinction of supplemental jurisdiction would be devastating. In cases in which the plaintiff had an
exclusive federal claim and a closely related nonfederal claim, the abolition of pendent jurisdiction would leave the plaintiff without a forum in which to bring both claims. The plaintiff in this circumstance
would have two options: She could split her lawsuit between federal
251. See Mengler, supra note 8, at 259-60; Perdue, supra note 12, at 566-70; see also
Finley, 490 U.S. at 572 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority on the grounds that
"[i]f the Court's demonstration were controlling, Gibbs [and the Court's other supplemental
jurisdiction cases] were incorrectly decided").
252. Mengler, supra note 8, at 260.
253. See, e.g., Freer, supra note 17, at 66-67; Matasar, A Pendent andAncillary Jurisdiction
Primer, supra note 17, at 167-69; Note, Toward a Theory of Incidental Jurisdiction, supra
note 21.
254. Harbor Ins. Co. v. Continental Corp., 922 F.2d 357, 361-62 (7th Cir. 1990). The
court ultimately held that until the Supreme Court actually discarded ancillary jurisdiction,
"we are bound by it and its logic, which embraces a Rule 13(e) counterclaim that arises out
of the same transaction or occurrence as the complaint." Id. But see Teledyne, Inc. v. Kone
Corp., 892 F.2d 1404, 1408 (9th Cir. 1989), in which the Ninth Circuit in dicta cited Finley
for the proposition that "[i]n.the case of pendent claim jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has
extended jurisdiction to the full extent authorized by Gibbs without conducting a close
examination of the relevant jurisdictional statutes."
255. Perdue, supra note 12, at 568.
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and state courts, or she could sue in only one forum and forsake either
the federal or state claim.
Neither option is desirable. First, to force a litigant to split her
case between the state and federal courts is both judicially inefficient
and inconvenient for the parties .216 This option is complicated further
by the principles of claim and issue preclusion; the issues resolved in
the first claim to reach final judgment might bind the parties in the
parallel litigation of the other claim. 2 7 The second alternative would
require the plaintiff to forego one of her claims and litigate the other
in either federal or state court. If both claims are substantial, this
option is clearly unsatisfactory. The alternative "of depriving litigants
of the practical means to litigate all of their colorable claims is inconsistent with the goals of any rational procedural system.' '218
In cases in which the plaintiff has a federal claim with concurrent
jurisdiction and a closely related nonfederal claim, the plaintiff would
have a third, equally unsatisfactory, option. In order to litigate both
claims in one forum, the plaintiff would likely bring the entire action
in state court.2 19 This third option sacrifices the plaintiff's opportunity
to have her federal claims adjudicated in a federal court. This undermines the congressional intent in creating federal jurisdiction: to
ensure plaintiffs have a meaningful choice between state and federal
26°
forums for the adjudication of their federal claims.
In cases in which the defendant has a nonfederal claim closely
related to the plaintiff's original claim, the abolition of supplemental
256. Mengler, supra note 8, at 269; see also supra notes 207-210 and accompanying text;
Musher Found. v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir.) (Clark, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 641 (1942), in which Judge Clark observed, "If the roast must be reserved
exclusively for the federal bench, it is anomalous to send the gravy across the street to the
state court house." Id.
257. See Miller, supra note 8, at 5-6. For a detailed discussion of the claim and issue
preclusive effect of state court findings in federal courts, and vice versa, see 18 FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JtURSDICTION,

supra note 8, §§ 4468-4472.

258. Mengler, supra note 8, at 269.
259. Schenkier, supra note 9, at 247-48; Note, Toward a Theory of Incidental Jurisdiction,
supra note 21, at 1936, 1943; see also Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 36 (1976) (Brennan,
J.,dissenting) (contending that forcing a federal plaintiff to litigate her case in both federal
and state courts impairs the ability of federal courts to grant relief and "imparts a fundamental
bias against utilization of the federal forum").
260. Schenkier, supra note 9, at 248. See also Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 36 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting), in which Justice Brennan argued:
[R]egardless of the monetary expense and other disadvantages of duplicate litigation,
regardless of the waste of judicial time and the "travesty on sound judicial administration," the Court by its per se rule forces upon a litigant the indefensible choice
of either suffering the costs of duplicate litigation or forgoing his right, a right
emphatically emphasized in the congressional policy, to a federal forum in which to
be heard on his federal claim.
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jurisdiction would have slightly different, but equally devastating, consequences. When the defendant seeks to bring a nonfederal claim under the federal court's extra-jurisdictional power, the plaintiff already
has chosen the federal court. Thus, access to a federal forum is a nonissue. An additional goal of supplemental jurisdiction, however, is to
ensure a convenient and efficient forum for the adjudication of an
entire controversy. By providing the defendant with the opportunity
to raise closely related counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party
claims, the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction allows both parties to
litigate their entire controversy in a federal forum. The doctrine also
ensures fairness to the defendant who is haled into court against his
will. Ancillary jurisdiction "provides an immediate forum for a party
involuntarily before a federal court who otherwise would be forced
to bring his related claim in a separate state court proceeding." ' 26'
The Finley Court acknowledged that its holding meant "the [judicial] efficiency and [litigant] convenience of a consolidated action
will sometimes have to be foregone in favor of separate actions in state
and federal courts. ' " m The Court, however, believed it had no choice,
D. The Supreme Court Invites Congress to Act
The Finley Court virtually invited Congress to fill the jurisdictional gaps its decision had created. 26" Justice Scalia wrote, "Whatever
we say regarding the scope of jurisdiction... can of course be changed
by Congress. What is of paramount importance is that Congress be
able to legislate against a background of clear interpretive rules, so
that it may know the effect of the language it adopts."26 The Court
ultimately concluded that deciding the case another way only would
lead to confusion. 26 After Finley, therefore, Congress was left with
the opportunity "to write on a clean slate." 2 7
I.

Congress Accepts the Supreme Court's Invitation: The
Statutory Resurrection of Supplemental Jurisdiction

Seventeen months after Finley, Congress accepted the Supreme
Court's invitation to codify federal extra-jurisdictional power. Both
261. Note, Toward a Theory of Incidental Jurisdiction, supra note 21, at 1937; see also
Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 376-77 (1977).
262. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 555 (1989).
263. Id. at 555-56.
264. H.R. REP. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE
CONo. & ADmI. NEWS 6860, 6874; Mengler, Burbank & Rowe, supra note 14, at 214; see
also 136 CONG. REc. S17580-81 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Sen. Grassley adopting
the House analysis).
265. Finley, 490 U.S. at 556.
266. Id.
267. Mengler, supra note 8, at 267.
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the House and the Senate believed it was necessary to provide federal
courts with the statutory authority to exercise jurisdiction over nonfederal claims. 268 Each house recognized the practical implications of
the Finley decision 269 and appreciated the benefits accompanying the
doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. The House Report states
that supplemental jurisdiction
has enabled federal courts and litigants to take advantage of the federal procedural rules on claim and party joinder to deal economically-in single rather than multiple litigation-with related
matters ....

Moreover, the district courts' exercise of supplemental

jurisdiction, by making federal court a practical arena for the resolution of an entire controversy, has effectuated Congress's intent
in the jurisdictional statutes to provide plaintiffs with a federal forum
for litigating claims within original federal jurisdiction.2Y0
As a result, Congress statutorily resurrected pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction in its enactment of section 1367.271 Applicable to all civil
actions commenced after December 1, 1990,272 section 1367 provides
in pertinent part:
(a) In General. -. Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)
or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil
action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all claims that
are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction
that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article
268.

H.R. REP. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 28, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. &
6860, 6874.
269. Id. (recognizing that Finley threatened to eliminate previously accepted forms of
supplemental jurisdiction).
270. Id.
271. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 is part of the Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act.
136 CONG. REC. H13301-07 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). The Federal Courts Study Committee
was born in the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988) (codified at scattered sections of Titles 5, 9, 16, 17, 18, 28, and
42), in which Congress commissioned the Committee to provide a comprehensive plan to
address the ever-increasing concerns of federal court congestion and workload. See 136 CONG.
Rac. E2501 (daily ed. July 26, 1990) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). Pursuant to the Act,
Chief Justice Rehnquist appointed a fifteen-member committee to study the federal courts and
recommend reforms. Id. The Federal Courts Study Committee completed its report on April
2, 1990. Id. Among its recommendations was the codification of pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE 47-48 (April 2, 1990). Congress accepted this recommendation in its enactment of
28 U.S.C. § 1367.
272. Courts have recognized that cases decided after the statute's enactment but filed
before its effective date are governed by Finley. E.g., Chelsey v. Union Carbide Corp., 927
F.2d 60, 65-66 n.3 (2d Cir. 1991); Lewis v. Windsor Door Co., 926 F.2d 729, 731 n.3 (8th
Cir. 1991); Ortega v. Schramm, 922 F.2d 684, 693 n.12 (l1th Cir. 1991); Harbor Ins. Co. v.
Continental Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357, 361-62 (7th Cir. 1990) (originally decided on Dec. 17,
1990, the opinion was amended on Dec. 20, 1990 to include discussion of section 1367).
ADMIN. NEws
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III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction
shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
(b) Diversity Cases. - In any civil action of which the district
courts have original jurisdiction founded solely on section 1332 of
this title, the district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction
under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made
parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs

under Rule 24 or such rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional
requirements of section 1332.273

The statute replaced the labels of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction
with the unifying principle of "supplemental jurisdiction." 274
A.

General Limitations on Supplemental Jurisdictional Power Pursuant
to Section 1367(a)

Prior to the enactment of section 1367, the Supreme Court had

adopted a uniform analytical framework for determining when a federal court had the power to hear a nonfederal claim. 27s This involved
a two-step inquiry into whether the federal court had constitutional
and statutory authorization to exercise pendent or ancillary jurisdiction. In its enactment of section 1367, Congress adopted a modified
version of this two-step approach.
(1) The ConstitutionalInquiry

In its analytical framework, the Supreme Court did not define
the extent of the federal courts' constitutional power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in all contexts. In Kroger, the Court simply assumed that Gibbs determined the outer boundaries of constitutionally
permissible jurisdiction in all federal cases. 276 Similarly, in Finley, the
Court "assume[d], without deciding, that the constitutional criterion
273. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West Supp. 1991). The statute further provides that district
courts have discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction in certain circumstances. Id. §
1367(c). The remainder of this Note will concentrate on the new boundaries of federal judicial
power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) and (b). Analysis of
the federal courts' authority to use discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction under
subsection (c), will not be examined.
274. See Harbor Ins. Co. v. Continental Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357, 362 (7th Cir. 1990);
C.D.S. Diversified, Inc. v. Franchise Fin. Corp., 757 F. Supp. 202, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 1991);
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Loube, 134 F.R.D. 270, 274 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
275. See supra notes 191-204, 230-235 and accompanying text.
276. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 371 n.10 (1978).
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for pendent-party jurisdiction is analogous to the constitutional criterion for pendent-claim jurisdiction.''277
Congress alleviated much confusion and inconsistency by uniformly limiting supplemental jurisdictional power. Section 1367 only
requires that the nonfederal claims be "so related to claims in the
action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same
case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." 278 Section 1367(a)'s second sentence equally extends the boundaries of supplemental power over claims involving the addition of
parties. 279 Congress thus intended to codify the scope of supplemental

jurisdiction articulated by the Supreme Court in Gibbs,28 0 and to expand its application to all contexts of supplemental jurisdiction.28
The question remains as to what is the proper standard to determine the boundaries of federal supplemental power. Because federal
22
courts have defined and applied the constitutional criteria for pendent 1

and ancillary 283 jurisdiction inconsistently, it is now imperative to develop a uniform constitutional standard to apply section 1367.

Much of the previous confusion may be attributable to the Supreme Court's language in Gibbs.2 4 Although citing the Federal Rules
as a basis for its liberal approach to pendent jurisdiction, the Court
adopted a "common nucleus of operative fact" test, rather than the
"same transaction or occurrence" language used in the Federal Rules
and associated with ancillary jurisdiction. 28 5 Although courts and com-

mentators have attempted to interpret the "common nucleus of operative fact" standard, 28 6 they may have erred by placing too much
significance on the Supreme Court's choice of language in the Gibbs
277. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 549 (1989).
278. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a) (West Supp. 1991).
279. This provision modifies current law by repudiating Finley, and thus resolves the
controversy over pendent-party jurisdiction. See H.R. REP. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
28-29, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6860, 6874-75; Harbor Ins. Co.
v. Continental Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357, 362 (7th Cir. 1990); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Walter, No. 90C 5577 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist file).
280. H.R. RP. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 n.15, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE
CoNG. & ADnim. NEWS 6860, 6875 n.15.
281. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a) (West Supp. 1991). It should be noted that subsection (b)
places further limitations on supplemental jurisdiction in cases solely founded on diversity
jurisdiction. See infra Part III.B.
282. See supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 101-118 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 215-219 and
accompanying text (discussing the unsuccessful attempts to compare the standards used to
extend pendent and ancillary jurisdiction).
284. Matasar, Rediscovering "One Constitutional Case," supra note 17, at 1452-53.
285. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
286. See supra notes 59-69, 215-218 and accompanying text.
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decision. 2 87 District Court Judge Herbert Goodrich observed in his
speech to the Nebraska State Bar Association:
I suppose one great weakness which... judges are addicted to
is the lack of care in the use of words ....

It is the habit of judges

to express their own legal conclusions in their own way, and the first
thing you will find the same legal conclusions being expressed in half
a dozen different ways in the same opinion in the same court-the
same opinion expressed half a dozen different ways by half a dozen
different judges ....

One of our dangers is and was very definitely a carelessness or
noncommon use in connection with languages. 25
To equate, rather than distinguish, the standards of "common
nucleus of operative fact" and "same transaction and occurrence"
may be fiore consistent with the Gibbs decision. 289 In a subsequent
case, Justice Brennan, author of the Gibbs decision, stated that "the
question of Art. III power in the federal judiciary to exercise subjectmatter jurisdiction concerns whether the claims asserted are such as
'would ordinarily be expected to [be tried] in one judicial proceeding."'2 90 Justice Brennan's statement does not mention the "common
nucleus of operative fact" language. Instead, it focuses on the third
criterion under Gibbs of single trial expectancy. Although this does
not establish that Justice Brennan intended to repudiate the standard
he announced in Gibbs, his emphasis on the third criterion suggests
his preference for a pragmatic approach, rather than a mechanistic
adherence to a formula. Brennan's focus emphasizes the purposes underlying extra-jurisdictional power, as opposed to the need for some
requisite factual overlap. Emphasizing the common goals underlying
supplemental jurisdiction unifies the varying standards previously associated with pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. 29
287. Matasar, Rediscovering "One Constitutional Case," supra note 17, at 1453.
288. Goodrich, Restatement, 25 NEB. L. REv. 159, 164 (1945) (as quoted in Forrester,
Truth in Judging: Supreme Court Opinions as Legislative Drafting, 38 VArN. L. REv. 463,
468 (1985)); see also Forrester, supra at 467-69 (arguing that the Supreme Court has caused
much confusion by its inconsistent and haphazard use of language).
289. See Matasar, Rediscovering "One Constitutional Case," supra note 17, at 1453-54
(arguing that the 'transactional' approach more closely adheres to the intent of Gibbs");
Schenkier, supra note 9 (arguing that Gibbs establishes a transactional standard for pendent
jurisdiction); see also Comment, Toward A Synthesis of Two Doctrines, supra note 43, at
1280 (contending that "Gibbs did away with most of the distinctions between pendent and
ancillary jurisdiction").
290. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 20 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting a series
of Second Circuit opinions by Judge Friendly).
291. The legislative history of section 1367 further supports equating the ancillary and
pendent jurisdictional standards. In its recommendation to codify the doctrines of pendent
and ancillary jurisdiction, the Federal Courts Study Committee advised that "Congress expressly
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When determining the boundaries of supplemental power, courts
should focus on the fundamental goals underlying this power-judicial
efficiency, convenience, fairness to litigants, and the creation of an
attractive federal forum to vindicate federal rights. 292 A standard that
focuses on the logical relationship between the federal and nonfederal
claims furthers these underlying goals better than a standard that focuses on factual identity between the claims. Such a standard would
be consistent with both Gibbs, which marked the rejection of factual
identity as the standard for determining supplemental power, 29 and
section 1367, which focuses on the purposes underlying the congressional grant of supplemental jurisdiction. 294 Thus, under a pragmatic
approach, which emphasizes the logical relationship between claims,
supplemental jurisdiction should be exercised when enough connection
exists between the federal and nonfederal claims that litigating them
295
together would be efficient and just.
To alleviate confusion, the "transaction or occurrence" language
in the Federal Rules 296 should be interpreted consistently with the
"logical relationship" approach. 297 Permissive counterclaims, for exauthorize federal courts to hear any claim arising out of the same 'transaction or occurrence'
as a claim within federal jurisdiction." FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM=rIEE, REPORT OF Ti
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY CommTTEE 47 (April 2, 1990) (emphasis added). Furthermore, in

describing the federal courts' authority to exercise supplemental jurisdiction prior to Finley,
the House Report states that "Supplemental jurisdiction has enabled federal courts and litigants
to take advantage of the federal procedural rules on claim and party joinder to deal economically ... with related matters, usually those arising from the same transaction, occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences." H.R. REp. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 28,
reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CoNo. & ADMIN. NEws 6860, 6874 (emphasis added). Congress
thus intended to codify the Gibbs standard of supplemental jurisdiction, id. at 28, 29 n.15,
while referring to the "same transaction or occurrence" language.
292. See H.R. REP. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 28, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADmIN. NEWS 6860, 6874.

293. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 714, 724-25 (1966). See also Schenkier,
supra note 9, at 266-71.
294. See H.R. REP. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADmIN. NEws 6860, 6874-75.
295. This standard may require only a loose factual connection. See Mengler, supra note
8, at 274 (arguing that federal courts have fostered efficiency by requiring only a loose factual
connection between the federal and related nonfederal claims); see also supra notes 62-63, 107109 and accompanying text (discussing cases taking this approach).
296. See FED. R. Crv. P. 13, 14, 19, 20, and 24.
297. Some lower federal courts have taken this approach. See supra notes 105-109 and
accompanying text. Because the Federal Rules cannot extend or limit the scope of federal
jurisdiction, FED. R. Crv. P. 82, the definition of "same transaction or occurrence" -inthe
Federal Rules should be equivalent to the definition of a "constitutional case." Claims make
up a "constitutional case" when they are logically related. See Consolo v. Federal Maritime
Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 617 n.14 (1966); Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co.,
Inc., 286 F.2d 631, 633 (3d Cir. 1961); see also Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction of Federal
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ample, consist of any claims against an opposing party "not arising
out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the opposing party's claim. ' 298 Thus, courts should continue to
construe this provision as requiring an independent basis for jurisdiction. 299 Although some courts have held that the transaction or occurrence language does not define the outer boundaries of supplemental
jurisdiction,3°° the extension of jurisdiction beyond the logical relationship boundaries would constitute an unconstitutional usurpation
of power.3 0 '
The best approach to determine the boundaries of federal supplemental power is pragmatic rather than definitional.30 2 Application
of a pragmatic approach appropriately focuses on the central goals
underlying the grant of supplemental power. It will foster judicial efficiency and party convenience by creating one sensible litigation package. Furthermore, it will make the use of federal courts more attractive,
thus promoting the congressional intent underlying the original federal
jurisdictional statutes. This interpretation allows federal courts to concentrate on the case before it, rather than engaging in verbal gymnastics to determine whether it should exercise supplemental
jurisdiction.
(2) The Statutory Inquiry
Section 1367 provides the express congressional authorization that
federal courts needed after Finley to exercise pendent or ancillary jurisdiction.30° The previously required statutory inquiry remains, but as
Courts, supra note 172, at 483 (arguing that because the Federal Rules cannot change federal

jurisdiction, the same test should be used to determine when a person can intervene as of
right under FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a) and when ancillary jurisdiction exists).
298.
299.
300.
301.

FED. R. Crv. P. 13(b) (emphasis added).
See supra note 122.
E.g., Abromovage v. United Mine Workers, 726.F.2d 972, 990 (3d Cir. 1984).
But see Matasar, Rediscovering "One Constitutional Case," supra note 17, at 1478-

79, in which Professor Matasar argues that:
"Case" or "controversy" as used in article III refers to the limits of joinder of
claims and parties set by the system of rules lawfully adopted to govern procedure

in the federal courts. Supplemental jurisdiction, therefore, is constitutionally permissible whenever the rules governing federal procedure permit the joinder in one
action of jurisdictionally insufficient nonfederal claims or parties with a jurisdictionally sufficient federal claim.
Id. at 1478-79. It appears, therefore, that Professor Matasar would advocate the joinder of

permissive counterclaims pursuant to FED. R. Cav. P. 13(b) under supplemental jurisdiction
because the Federal Rules so provide.
302. See 6 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVwm, supra note 59, § 1410.
303. See Harbor Ins. Co. v. Continental Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357, 362 (7th Cir. 1990)

1658

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[V/ol. 42

an altered and less limiting principle. Under Aldinger v. Howard34 and
Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 0 5 a federal court had to
determine whether Congress had explicitly or implicitly negated supplemental jurisdiction. 0 6 After Finley v. UnitedStates,30 a federal court
had to determine whether Congress had explicitly authorized supplemental jurisdiction.0 8 Now, a federal court need only determine whether
the statute conferring federal jurisdiction explicitly rejects supple39
mental jurisdiction. 0
B.

Additional Limitations in Federal Diversity Cases Pursuant to Section
1367(b)

Section 1367(a) applies equally to cases based on the federal courts'
diversity jurisdiction. 310 In diversity cases, however, subsection (b) places
special limitations on supplemental jurisdiction. By focusing on the
basis of the federal court's jurisdiction as the primary determinant of
the courts' power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, Congress has
acknowledged the Supreme Court's trend of distinguishing between
supplemental power in diversity and federal question cases. 3 11 Thus,
the initial inquiry is whether the federal court's original jurisdiction
is based on federal question or diversity, and not whether the exercise
of supplemental jurisdiction is pendent or ancillary.
In diversity actions, subsection (b) prohibits federal courts from
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims against parties joined by any of the Federal Rules' joinder provisions when supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the
(noting that section 1367 overrules Finley and provides a statutory basis for supplemental
jurisdiction); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Walter, No. 90 C 5566 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 1991)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (noting that "Congress has .. .mooted the Finley decision
by enacting legislation that authorizes pendent-party jurisdiction).
304. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
305. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
306. See Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18; Kroger, 437 U.S. at 372-76.
307. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
308. Id. at 549-51.
309. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a) (West Supp. 1991). Under section 1367, the federal courts
are empowered to exercise supplemental jurisdiction unless another federal statute "expressly
provides otherwise." Id. (emphasis added). At least one district court specifically has held that
section 1367 eliminates the statutory barrier which was determinative in the Aldinger decision.
Rosen v. Chang, 758 F. Supp. 799, 803-04 (D.R.I. 1991). Observing that Aldinger does not
apply after section 1367, the court asserted supplemental jurisdiction over an additional party
in a factual context virtually identical to that in Aldinger. Id.
310. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West Supp. 1991).
311. See supra notes 201-204 and accompanying text.
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jurisdictional requirements of the diversity statute. 312 This includes impleader, compulsory party joinder, permissive joinder, and intervention. Similarly, subsection (b) prohibits the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction in connection with the joinder or intervention of third
313
parties as plaintiffs when inconsistent with section 1332.
(1) A ProperInterpretation of Section 1367(b)'s Limitations
At least three interpretations of subsection (b) are possible. First,
subsection (b) might be read expansively to prohibit the exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction anytime a plaintiff raises a claim against a
nondiverse defendant in a diversity case. This reading may be supported by the rationale that allowing a claim between nondiverse parties in a diversity action facially violates section 1332's complete
diversity requirement.
The legislative history of section 1367, however, counters this expansive reading. In the discussion of subsection (b), the House Report
states:
In diversity-only actions the district courts may not hear plaintiffs'
supplemental claims when exercising supplemental jurisdiction would
encourage plaintiffs to evade the jurisdictional requirements of 28
U.S.C. § 1332 by the simple expedient of naming initially only those
defendants whose joinder satisfies section 1332's requirements and
later adding claims not within original federal jurisdiction against
other defendants
who have intervened or been joined on a supple14
mental basis.
Thus, courts should focus on whether extension of supplemental
jurisdiction under the circumstances would encourage plaintiffs to circumvent the diversity jurisdiction requirements. This does not necessarily include every situation in which the exercise of supplemental
315
jurisdiction facially would violate the diversity statute.
The explicit language of section 1367(b) also supports a less expansive reading. The last clause of subsection (b) focuses on whether
the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction would be inconsistent with
the diversity jurisdiction requirements. 316 If Congress intended to prohibit all claims brought by plaintiffs against nondiverse defendants in
diversity actions, it could have provided for this explicitly. For example, the last clause could have provided that district courts shall
not exercise supplemental jurisdiction when extending jurisdiction
312. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(b) (West Supp. 1991).
313. Id.
314. H.R. REP. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted in 1990 U.S.
ADm.

NEWS 6860, 6875 (emphasis added).

315. See infra notes 321-327 and accompanying text.
316. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(b) (West Supp. 1991).
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would violate section 1332's requirements. Instead, by providing that
federal courts should determine whether the simultaneous exercises of
supplemental and diversity jurisdictions are inconsistent, Congress directs federal courts not to focus upon section 1332's literal requirements, but to examine whether the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction
would encourage plaintiffs' evasion of those requirements.
A second possible interpretation of subsection (b) is a narrow
approach. Such a reading might lead to a conclusion that subsection
(b) applies only to cases in which a plaintiff attempts to join the nondiverse defendant or a party attempts to intervene as a plaintiff. Thus,
if a defendant initiates joinder of a nondiverse third party-as in the
case of impleader of a third-party defendant-then the plaintiff subsequently may bring a claim against that party.
Although commentators have argued that supplemental jurisdiction in this context does not encourage plaintiffs to circumvent the
complete diversity requirement,3117 Congress' intent excludes such a
narrow interpretation of section 1367. According to the House Report,
"[t]he net effect of subsection (b) is to implement the principal rationale of Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger."3 18 The Kroger
decision prohibited the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over a
plaintiff's claim against a nondiverse third party defendant. Even
though the defendant had initiated the joinder of the third party, the
plaintiff could not bring a claim against the third party defendant in
federal court.31 9 Because the most narrow interpretation of section
1367(b) is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's Kroger decision, it
is also inconsistent with Congress' intent underlying the enactment of
the statute.
The most reasonable interpretation of section 1367(b) falls between the expansive and narrow approaches. The optimal solution focuses on Congress' intent but limits the application of the statute's
restrictions to only those contexts in which Congress' concerns may
arise. Congress' primary concern underlying subsection (b) was that
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over additional nondiverse parties
in diversity cases "would encourage plaintiffs to evade the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332."320 This concern, however,
317.
318.

See supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
H.R. REP. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 n.16, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws 6860, 6875 n.16. It should be noted that even though the Kroger
decision has been criticized severely, one of its positive aspects was eliminating some of the
federal courts' workload by reducing the federal diversity docket and shifting pure state law
claims to the state courts. Mengler, supra note 8, at 286. The significance of this result has
grown since the Kroger decision. See supra note 6, and accompanying text.
319. See Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-77 (1978).
320. H.R. REP. No. 732, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 6860, 6875.
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does not arise every time a plaintiff raises a claim against a nondiverse
defendant in a diversity case.
Once the plaintiff is placed in a defensive position, 32 1 because a
party in a defensive posture asserts a claim against her, extending supplemental jurisdiction over her logically related claim against a nondiverse party would not encourage the circumvention of the complete
diversity requirement. Two possibilities under Federal Rule 14 are relevant in this context: First, if a third-party defendant asserts a claim
against the plaintiff that is logically related to the plaintiff's original
claim, 3" Federal Rule 14(a) provides that the plaintiff may assert a
compulsory counterclaim to the third-party defendant's claim. 323 Second, if a defendant raises a compulsory counterclaim against the plaintiff, Federal Rule 14(b) provides that the plaintiffmay implead a third
party who is or may be liable to her for all or part of the defendant's
3
claim against her. 2
The Kroger rationale might be read to prohibit the exercise of
jurisdiction in either of these contexts. As in Kroger, the plaintiff in
both scenarios is asserting a nonfederal claim against a nondiverse
third party. Under the Kroger rationale, "[c]hoice of forum determines posture. The party who chooses the forum is in an offensive
3
posture." 71
A better approach, however, is to distinguish Kroger because the
plaintiff in these contexts is in a defensive position. Given that the
plaintiff is asserting her claim defensively, there can be no fear that
326
she is attempting to circumvent the complete diversity requirement.
Moreover, when the plaintiff is subject to an adversarial claim, considerations of fairness favor the extension of supplemental jurisdiction. 327
321. As used herein, "position" is distinguished from "posture." "Posture" is determined
by the choice of forum: the party who chooses the forum is in an offensive posture. See supra
notes 142-143 and accompanying text. In contrast, "position" is determined by the assertion
of a claim: the party against whom the relevant claim is asserted is in a defensive position.
See, e.g., Brown & Caldwell v. Inst. for Energy Funding, Ltd., 617 F. Supp. 649, 651 (C.D.
Cal. 1985). The plaintiff in the preceding case would be described as being in an offensive
posture but a defensive position: the plaintiff chose the federal forum placing her in the
offensive posture, but when the defendant brought a counterclaim against the plaintiff, the
plaintiff was put in a defensive position.
322. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
323. FED. R. CIv. P. 14(a).
324. FED. R. Crv. P. 14(b).
325. Note, Toward a Theory of Incidental Jurisdiction, supra note 21, at 1944. See supra

text accompanying notes 142-143.
326. See, e.g., Basic Mach. Co. v. Ketom Constr., Inc., 686 F. Supp. 542, 543-44
(M.D.N.C. 1988); Brown & Caldwell v. Institute for Energy Funding, Ltd., 617 F. Supp. 649,

651 (C.D. Cal. 1985); supra notes 151-153 and accompanying text.
327.

This rationale also supports the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction when a plaintiff
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Thus, a proper interpretation of section 1367(b) limits its application to situations in which a party, seeking either to raise a claim
against a nondiverse third party or to intervene, is in an offensive
posture and an offensive position. In other words, the term "plaintiff" in subsection (b) should not include plaintiffs placed in a defensive position.
(2) Elimination of an Anomaly
Although courts and commentators have argued that supplemental jurisdiction is proper over intervenors of right, 28 section 1367(b)
explicitly prohibits the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over claims
by persons "seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24."329 Arguably, supplemental jurisdiction in this context is consistent with the
Kroger opinion and, thus, consistent with Congress' desire to "implement the principal rationale" of Kroger.3 0 Allowing supplemental
jurisdiction over persons who intervene as plaintiffs, however, may
encourage circumvention of the diversity jurisdiction requirements.
For example, two plaintiffs, X and Y, each have state claims against
one defendant, but only X is diverse as to the defendant. Although
both X and Y wish to bring their actions in federal court, only X can
bring its action in federal court. X does so, and when the action is
commenced, Y files an application to intervene as of right. Y meets
the requirements of Federal Rule 24(a). 331 To allow supplemental jurisdiction in this context, however, permits Y to evade the jurisdictional requirement of complete diversity. 332 Congress found this scenario
to be a viable risk when it enacted section 1367(b), because it clearly
prohibits the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over claims by in333
tervening plaintiffs.
The possibility does remain, however, that a nondiverse defendant
may intervene. By exclusion, section 1367(b) permits the exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction over claims by persons seeking to intervene
joins a nondiverse third-party as part of its defense to a counterclaim or cross-claim under
FED. R. Crv. P. 13(h).
328. See supra notes 172-176, 186-190 and accompanying text.
329. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(b) (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
330. H.R. REP. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 n.16, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6860, 6875 n.16.
331. See supra text accompanying note 169.

332.

But see 7C

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:

CiVIm, supra note 59, § 1917, at 477

(arguing that ancillary jurisdiction in this context does not encourage circumvention of the
complete diversity requirement).
333. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(b) (West Supp. 1991).
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as defendants under Federal Rule 24. 34 This is consistent with the recommended interpretation of section 1367(b). 335 Because an intervening
defendant does not choose the forum or assert the relevant claim, she
is in both a defensive posture and a defensive position. Thus, there
is no concern that such a party is attempting to circumvent the complete diversity requirement.
Similarly, section 1367(b) significantly modifies prior law regarding the joinder of parties under Federal Rule 19. Subsection (b)
provides that in diversity actions "district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction... over claims by persons proposed to be joined
as plaintiffs under Rule 19 ... .-"336 Thus, although section 1367 prohibits the joinder of a plaintiff if it would defeat the court's diversity
jurisdiction, by exclusion it permits a necessary defendant to be joined
pursuant to Federal Rule 19 on a supplemental basis. 337 Federal Rule
19 provides that joinder of a necessary nonparty is feasible only if such
joinder will not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. 338 In
the case of a necessary nondiverse defendant, section 1367(b) now provides the courts with supplemental jurisdiction to make joinder of that
defendant feasible in a diversity action. Prior to the enactment of section 1367, a nondiverse third party could not be joined under Federal
Rule 19 in a diversity action, either as a plaintiff or defendant, because
339
it would destroy the diversity jurisdiction of the federal court.
By prohibiting supplemental jurisdiction when the plaintiff seeks
to join or intervene, but authorizing supplemental jurisdiction when
the defendant seeks to join or intervene, Congress has alleviated the
previously existing anomaly.m The exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in the contexts of intervention and compulsory joinder now depends on whether the person seeking to intervene or sought to be joined
is a plaintiff or a defendant; it is irrelevant whether the absentee is
341
classified as merely a "necessary" or an "indispensable" party. It
334. It should be noted that section 1367(b) does not distinguish between intervention of
right under FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a) and permissive intervention under FED. R. Cirv. P. 24(b).
Thus, it appears that, where a person seeks to intervene permissively as a defendant in a
diversity case and her claim is logically related to the main claim, the federal court is empowered
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. This constitutes a change in the law prior to Finley. See
supra note 172.
335. See supra notes 320-327 and accompanying text.
336. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(b) (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
337. Section 1367(b), however, prohibits the plaintiff from initiating a claim against the
newly joined defendant unless the plaintiff is placed in a defensive position. See supra notes
319-327 and accompanying text.
338. FED. R. Cv. P. 19(a).
339. See supra notes 162-165 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 177-183 and accompanying text.
341. It must be noted, however, that these classifications still are relevant to the court's
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is also irrelevant whether the absentee seeks to intervene or is brought
into the action by the original parties.3 42 By so providing, Congress

has created consistent rules for fair, efficient, and predictable joinder.
The propriety of supplemental jurisdiction over additional parties now

is founded on the genuine concern of encouraging the evasion of
jurisdictional requirements. It no longer is determined by random judicial categorization of those parties seeking to join or intervene.

Conclusion
The effectiveness of the federal judicial system as it relates to
extra-jurisdictional power was seriously threatened by the Finley decision. Congress alleviated this threat and made substantial systemic
improvements with its statutory resurrection of supplemental jurisdiction. 343 Through the enactment of section 1367 of the United States
Code, Title 28, Congress also alleviated much of the inconsistency
plaguing the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. By so
providing, Congress expanded the courts' pre-Finley pendent and an-

cillary powers in some directions 34 while restricting them in others.
Section 1367 supplies the federal district courts with a uniform

analytical framework for the determination of supplemental jurisdictional power. First, in any case falling within original federal jurisdiction, the district court must determine whether the supplemental
claims are so related to the federal claims that they form part of the
same constitutional case as defined by Article 111. 34 5 This Note suggests
that the Constitution, and thus the statute, require no more than a
logical relationship between the federal and supplemental claims. Emphasis should not be placed on the degree of factual overlap between

the principal and supplemental claims; in some cases no more than
determination of whether it may proceed in the person's absence when supplemental power
does not exist. For example, when the federal court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the absentee, and that absentee is an "indispensable" party under Federal Rule 19(b),
the court should deny intervention or joinder and consider dismissing the entire action. H.R.
REP. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
6860, 6875. See supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text.
342. This constitutes a significant change in prior law. See H.R. REP. No. 734, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6860, 6875.
343. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West Supp. 1991).
344. Some lower federal courts have already recognized that § 1367 expands federal
supplemental power. See, e.g., FDIC v. Loube, 134 F.R.D. 270, 274 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(noting that § 1367 "expands the jurisdiction of the U.S. District Courts into a new concept
of 'supplemental jurisdiction;' broader than the former concept of ancillary or pendent
jurisdiction") (emphasis added).
345. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a) (West Supp. 1991).
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a loose factual connection will be necessary. Instead, federal courts
should use a pragmatic approach, focusing on judicial efficiency, convenience, fairness to the litigants, and the congressional purpose of
creating a meaningful choice between state and federal forums for the
vindication of federal rights.
This extension of supplemental power to the outer limits of the
Constitution applies to claims between existing parties and claims involving the joinder or intervention of additional parties. 346 Congress,
thus, has alleviated the doctrinal problems previously accompanying
47
pendent-party jurisdiction3
The second step under the new analysis consists of a revised statutory inquiry. Before exercising supplemental jurisdiction, a federal
court must determine whether Congress, in the relevant jurisdictional
statute, has explicitly rejected supplemental jurisdiction in the partic3 48
ular context.
Finally, Congress has placed special limitations on supplemental
jurisdiction over claims involving the joinder or intervention of additional nondiverse parties in cases based solely on diversity of citizenship.3 49 These additional restrictions, however, should be applied
only in those diversity cases where the congressional concerns underlying section 1367(b) exist: cases in which extending jurisdiction "would
encourage plaintiffs to evade the jurisdictional requirements" of the
diversity statute. 30 Properly interpreted, section 1367(b) only prevents
federal courts from hearing supplemental claims either asserted by a
plaintiff in an offensive position against a nondiverse party, or raised
by a nondiverse absentee proposed to be joined or seeking to intervene
as a plaintiff. Congress has rejected the previous anomalous distinctions between party joinder and intervention, and between necessary
and indispensable parties. Congress has substituted a uniform jurisdictional approach which balances the benefits of applying supplemental jurisdiction liberally with the jurisdictional requirements of
diversity jurisdiction. As a result, in diversity cases, some supplemental
claims that previously were excluded now come within the federal
courts' supplemental jurisdiction; other claims that previously were
within the courts' ancillary powers are now excluded, but only where
346. Id.
347.
(1989).

See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976); Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545

348. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a) (West Supp. 1991).
349.
350.

ADIm.

Id. § 1367(b).
H.R. Rm. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. &

NEws 6860, 6875.
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it appears that the original plaintiff or co-plaintiff intervenor have
manipulated jurisdiction.
As interpreted herein, section 1367 provides federal courts with
consistent rules of claim and party joinder. The Author hopes that
federal courts will effectuate the statute's overall policy of encouraging
the fair and efficient use of the federal judicial system. This only will
be accomplished though the responsible application of the new rules
of supplemental jurisdiction.

